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ABSTRACT
My thesis consists of four chapters that examine how productivity is aected
by government policies and market regulations. In particular, I study the impact of
policy reforms on productivity through their eect on: (a) the allocation of resources
across heterogeneous establishments, and (b) productivity at the establishment-level
via technology adoption. In chapter one, I develop a theoretical model to analyze the
eect of environmental policies on industry productivity and market competition. In
my model, environmental regulations aect not only the allocation of resources across
incumbent rms but also the incentive of rms to invest in pollution-abatement tech-
nologies. My ndings imply that environmental regulations raise both environmental
quality (by incentivizing the adoption of \cleaner" technologies), and industry pro-
ductivity (by reallocating resources to more productive rms). In chapters two and
three, using micro-level data from Indian manufacturing plants, I study total factor
productivity (TFP) growth, and the contribution of rm-level subsidies to overall
TFP growth. My analysis recognizes that while size-dependent subsidies may induce
technology adoption for recipient rms, they also generate misallocation of resources
across rms. I focus on the India subsidy program initiated in 2005 in Iron and
Steel Industry. In chapter two, my growth accounting provides evidence of an ac-
celeration of TFP growth after 2005 but primarily among plants that adopted more
productive technologies. In chapter three, using a general equilibrium model with
heterogeneous rms and a technology choice at the rm-level, I examine the impact
of size-dependent subsidies on industry productivity. I show that while the induced
ii
misallocation tends to reduce productivity, technology adoption raises it. In the con-
text of this model, the policy contributed about 20% to the observed productivity
growth. In chapter four, I assess the eect of labor market reforms on measures of
productivity across Indian states. Using a state-level labor reform index, and plant-
level data, I show that large plants, in labor intensive industries, operating in the
states with exible labor market are more likely to gain from labor market reforms
through an improvement in TFP and labor productivity.
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CHAPTER 1
The Impact of Environmental Policies on Productivity and Market
Competition
1.1 Introduction
According to the traditional view of environmental policy, regulations impose
additional costs on rms and force them to devote some of their resources to abate-
ment activities. As a result, the overall global competitiveness of regulated rms
deteriorates in comparison to non-regulated rms (Palmer et al., 1995). This con-
ventional paradigm was challenged by Michael Porter (Porter, 1991) and Porter and
van der Linde (1995) who suggest that pollution is often a waste of resources, and
a well-designed environmental policy can actually spur innovation at the rm-level,
leading the regulated rms to gain higher eciency and competitive advantage over
their unregulated rivals.
Among the growing body of work on environmental policies, two sets of studies
have emerged. The focus of the rst set has been on the impact of environmental
policies on innovation (Jae and Palmer, 1997). This literature suggests that en-
vironmental regulations provide strong incentives for rms to invest in R&D which
utilizes production process or reduces cost of inputs at the rm-level. However, since
these studies did not assess whether the benets of innovation are higher than the
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cost of policy, they are described as the \weak" version of the Porter Hypothesis.1
In contrast, the \strong" form of the environmental policies suggests that innovation
induced by the environmental regulations can benet rms by more than fully o-
setting the cost of the policy. In this literature, the overall impacts of environmental
regulations are quantied by measuring the performance of rms in such areas as
higher productivity and prot or lower production and input costs (Xepapadeas and
Zeeuw, 1999; Yokoo, 2009; Berman and Bui, 2001; Alpay et al., 2002).
Although the strong form of the Porter Hypothesis is well regarded in the liter-
ature, the impact of environmental policies on market performance is not conclusive
and thus the assessment of this potential \win-win" situation remains an open re-
search question. For example, a review of the existing literature on the eect of
environmental policies reveals that less attention has been given to understanding
the channels through which environmental regulations lead to competitiveness. In
the Porter Hypothesis, lack of innovation and technology diusion are the main
sources of ineciency in economic activities. The Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
of an unregulated economy can be potentially higher because rms are not using
the frontier abatement technologies. A well-designed environmental policy induces
innovation at the rm-level which increases productivity of individual rms and the
whole economy thereafter. If the induced technological change is the primary source
1 For example, if the innovation is benecial, then the unregulated rms would
also take the advantage of the opportunity and invest in the R&D projects.
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of productivity gain, then the environmental regulations must lead to a Pareto im-
provement or a \win-win" situation by not only protecting the environment, but also
enhancing aggregate productivity and competitiveness.
In the assessment of the link between environmental regulations and competi-
tiveness, the role of market competition is central. Competition is desirable since it
contributes to the eciency of economic activities and knowledge spillover (Aghion
et al. 2005; Herrendorf and Bai, 2009). A study by Holmes and Schmitz (2010) shows
that rms that survive in an intensied competitive environment are most likely to
have larger productivity gains, and those gains often account for the majority of the
overall industry benets. The link between competition and competitiveness is also
well regarded in the literature. While competition is about the nature and quality
of rivalry, competitiveness refers to the outcome of competition. Therefore, compet-
itiveness involves the ability of rms to face competition on a sustainable basis. It
should be noted that, while markets work fairly well much of the time, the eective
competition is not automatic, and can be damaged by policy distortions. There-
fore, environmental policies will lead to a higher market eciency and competitive
advantage of rms only if the regulations enhance the competitive environment too.2
2 Herrendorf and Bai (2009) argue that the relationship between competition and
productivity across various industries depends on how competition diers. If a larger
market size leads to more competition in an industry, then rms become more pro-
ductive. However, if a lower entry cost leads to tougher competition, then rms may
either choose lower or higher productivity levels.
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In this study, I examine the impact of environmental regulations on measures of
competition and productivity. A lower average price or a larger number of compet-
ing rms are characterized as an intensied competition. To incorporate endogenous
mark-ups that respond to the toughness of competition, the choice of consumer pref-
erences is crucial. The standard Dixit-Stiglitz preferences feature a constant elasticity
of substitution across varieties and are not well suited for studying the degree of com-
petition.3 Despite the simplicity and convenient analytical properties of the CES
utility function, it implies a constant distribution of mark-ups which are unaected
by any exogenous policy change. For example, an increase in emission tax will have
no eect on the average market price, or number of rms, which could potentially
reect tougher competition.4 So, my study adopts consumer preferences with a
linear demand system and horizontal product dierentiation following Ottaviano et
al. (2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). This utility function is tractable and
features variable mark-ups in the way that more productive rms will charge higher
3 See Melitz (2003) for the benchmark model of monopolistic competition with
heterogeneous rms; and Yokoo (2009) for an application to environmental policy
4 Some scholars adopted other forms of preferences with endogenous mark-ups.
In a study on the relationship between competition and productivity, Herrendorf
and Bai (2009) incorporated a Lancaster utility function. The demand derived from
the Lancaster preferences responds to market size but it is non-linear. Bergin et
al. (2001, 2007) used a symmetric translog expenditure function, which implies a
demand system with unitary income elasticity and non-constant price elasticity. It
is a homothetic function with no closed-form solution for the direct utility function.
The problem with the translog utility function is that there is no explicit solution
for the market price.
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mark-ups. Average productivity is endogenously determined through the selection
and allocation of resources across surviving rms.
To introduce the environmental concerns, I assume that pollution is a negative
externality. Firms do not fully measure the economic costs of their emission pro-
duced during production. Hence, the prot inaccurately portrays rms action as
positive, leading to an ineciency of resource allocation. I consider a production
technology that follows closely that of Levinson and Taylor (2003). In the context of
this technology, production process yield pollution as a side eect; however, rm can
reduce pollution through abatement activities. Firms do so by allocating a fraction
of their resources to production and the rest to abatement. To give a role for envi-
ronmental policy and study its impact on abatement technology, I extend the model
to allow for an endogenous investment in a clean abatement technology. Adopting a
cleaner abatement technology entails a higher cost than adopting a more polluting
technology but it increases productivity of abatement activities.
To regulate pollution, the government can select between economic and admin-
istrative policies. In particular, the government can use an emission tax policy or
introduce an emission standard that directly restricts a rm's level of emission. Un-
der an emission tax, rms pay tax per unit of emission produced during production,
whereas, under an emission standard, each rm is required to keep its emission-
output ratio below an exogenous level determined by the government. The emission
standard is the maximum rate of pollution that is legally allowed. A stricter environ-
mental policy takes the form of a higher emission tax or a higher emission standard.
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The ndings of this study imply that a stringent environmental policy leads to
an increase in average productivity and environmental quality but it reduces com-
petition in the market. However, the main source of productivity gain resulted from
environmental regulations is attributed to the general equilibrium eect (selection
eect) rather than the induced abatement technology change at the rm-level. In
particular, the policy has a primary positive impact on productivity at the rm-level
because regulations provide strong incentives for rms to adopt a cleaner abatement
technology. A stringent environmental policy also indirectly aects productivity and
market competition through the general equilibrium eect (secondary eect). Tech-
nology adoption is costly and increases marginal cost. Thus the expected prot prior
to entry decreases. The least productive rms exit the market and inputs are re-
allocated to surviving rms which are more productive on average. In contrast to
the standard model of rm heterogeneity in which high productivity rms set lower
prices, my model predicts that the surviving rms pass a part of higher marginal
cost to consumers by setting higher prices. Furthermore, a stringent environmental
policy has a negative impact on social welfare by lowering the number of varieties
produced in equilibrium.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model
with an emission tax policy. Section 3 evaluates the impact of emission tax on
social welfare. Section 4 assesses the eect of an emission standard policy. Section 5
concludes.
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1.2 Model
Consider an economy consists of L consumers with identical preferences. Labor
is the only factor of production. Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor
and xc0 unit of numeraire good.
Consumer Preferences
Consumer preferences V is given by,
V = U + Z (1.1)
where U is a function of consumer utility and Z is environmental quality. The
environmental quality has no aect on the consumer optimization problem. The
utility function is dened over a continuum set of dierentiated goods plus a homo-
geneous good taken to be a numeraire.
U = xc0 + 
Z


xcidi 
1
2

Z


(xci)
2di  1
2

Z


xcidi
2
(1.2)
; ;  > 0
where xi indexes the quantity of variety i and x0 is the quantity of the numeraire.
 denotes the intensity of preferences for the dierentiated goods.  and  determine
the substitution pattern between the dierentiated varieties and the numeraire. An
increase in  or a decrease in  shift out the demand for the dierentiated varieties
relative to the numeraire.  denotes the degree of product dierentiation between
varieties. If  = 0, then consumers only care about their aggregate consumption
level over all varieties. 
 is the set of intermediate goods.
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The budget constraint of a representative consumer is dened over the numeraire
good and other varieties as,
I = xc0 +
Z


pix
c
idi (1.3)
where I represents the indexed total of a consumer's income and pi denotes the
price of variety i. Maximizing utility function (1.1) subject to the budget constraint
(1.3) gives demand for each intermediate good. With a positive demand for the
numeraire good, the inverse demand function for the variety i is given by,
pi =    xci   X (1.4)
where X =
R


xcidi is the aggregate quantity of all varieties. If only a subset of
the intermediate goods are consumed in equilibrium (
 2 
), the inverted demand
equation for variety i changes to,
xci =

N + 
  1

pi +
N
N + 
1

p (1.5)
where p is the average price of all the varieties N in 
. With L consumers in
the economy, the aggregate demand for a particular variety xci is simply Lxi
c. Hence,
the aggregate demand becomes,
xi =
L
N + 
  L

pi +
N
N + 
L

p (1.6)
In equation (1.6), the demand for variety i is linear in price pi and the average
market price. xi also is determined by the size of the market and the elasticity of
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substitution between varieties. The maximum price that a consumer is willing to
pay for a particular variety is the price that drives demand for that variety to zero.
This price threshold pmax is calculated as,
pmax =
 + N p
N + 
(1.7)
By the standard argument, a tougher competition is characterized by a lower
average price or a larger number of competing rms, both of which reduce the price
threshold. Then, the demand system can be written in terms of pmax as,
xi =
L

(pmax   pi) (1.8)
Production Technology
I combined the production technology used by Levinson and Taylor (2003) with
the heterogeneous rm environment of Melitz (2003). There are a continuum number
of rms that are heterogeneous with respect to productivity level. To enter the
industry, rms must pay the irreversible xed entry cost fe. Once a rm enters the
market, it draws its productivity ' between 0 and 1 from a known and exogenous
distribution function. The productivity level of individual rms remains constant
across time. Since each rm produces a single variety, I follow the literature and use
' to index operating rms in the market hereafter. Hence, the index of varieties i
and rm level productivity ' are identical.
Labor is the only factor of production and is inelastically supplied in a com-
petitive market. The numeraire good is produced under constant returns to scale
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at unit cost; its market is also competitive. Firms devote a fraction of their input
(labor) 1   to production and the rest  to abatement. Each dierentiated good is
produced under constant returns to scale technology by rm ' which is given by,
x(') = ' (1  ') l' (1.9)
Production process also yields pollution as a side eect. However, rms can
reduce pollution by allocating the remaining labor input ' to abatement. Firms
can also invest in advanced abatement technologies that increase the productivity of
pollution reduction activities. The pollution production function is modeled under
constant returns to scale technology as,
z(') = f
1

' (b) (1  ') 1 l' (1.10)
where b is technology parameter and f
1

' (b) denotes the abatement technology
adopted by a rm with productivity ' such that f'(b) > 0, f
0
'(b) < 0, and f
00
'(b) > 0.
The convexity of the abatement technology indicates that as a rm with productivity
draw ' adopts a cleaner technology, its marginal eect decreases.5  is exogenous
and captures the eectiveness of abatement activities. A larger  indicates lower
abatement eciency.
5 This study rules out pollution generated during consumption.
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For tractability, the abatement technology is dened as f'(b) = 1=b' where
b' 2 (0; 1) and is summarized by the cost function c'(b), where 1=b' denotes the
level of abatement technology and x(') refer to the rms' output.6
c'(b) =
8><>:
1
b'
x'
'
0 < b' < 1
0 b' = 1
(1.11)
The optimal investment in the abatement technology is described as follows. Af-
ter rms observe their productivity level, they have access to a standard abatement
technology which is not environmentally friendly but is free. This standard technol-
ogy is captured by b' = 1. With the standard abatement technology, the emission
production function converts to the one in Levinson and Taylor (2003). Firms can
also invest in an advanced level of abatement technology at a cost that depends on
output size and productivity draw. Not all rms would be willing to use the more
advanced abatement technology since it would require them to cope with the higher
costs and complexity of a technology which needs highly specialized employees and
inputs. Thus, only more productive rms would be able to invest in clean abatement
technology. If the productivity draw demonstrates a low level of productivity relative
to the technology advancement, rms may select a simple abatement technology.7
6 Manseld (1993) shows that large rms tend to use more expensive forms of
technologies because they have more resources and are better able to take risks than
their smaller rivals.
7 It can be shown that the results are independent of the form of the abatement
technology cost as long as the cost function satises the properties of f'(b) and c'(b).
11
Now, the joint production function of intermediate goods and pollution is cal-
culated by combining production of intermediate goods (1.9) and production of pol-
lution (1.10) through substituting for 1  .
x(') =
1
b'
' z' l
1 
' (1.12)
The joint production function takes the form of a Cobb-Douglas production
function. The pollution is incorporated as an additional factor of production imply-
ing that production needs pollution as an undesirable input8 . The joint production
technology features two productivity parameters: the rm's productivity level (')
which is exogenous and the abatement technology parameter (1=b') which is endoge-
nously determined.
Environmental Policy
Governments can use many forms of emission reduction policies including volun-
tary actions, regulatory mechanisms, and price incentive policies. However, there is
a growing agreement among economists that putting a price on emissions is essential
to reduce pollution. An emission tax imposes a direct fee on the pollution that a rm
emits. The government can also use a regulatory mechanism to enforce an emission
reduction policy by setting a limit on level of emissions. In this study, I examine
the impact of both an emission tax policy and an emission standard policy on the
performance of rms.
8 We can think of z as the energy input to production of other goods which directly
leads to pollution.
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First, let's consider that the government introduces an emission-reduction reg-
ulation in form of an ad valorem tax  on pollution. Under a relatively low emission
tax rate, no abatement occurs and  remains zero. Therefore, I assume that the
emission tax is high enough to motivate rms to engage in abatement activities.
Within a competitive labor market, rms hire labor at wage w and emit at cost 
to produce intermediate goods. The standard cost minimization problem determines
demands for labor and pollution.
minfl;zgfwl' + z'g
s.t. x(') = 1
b'
' z' l
1 
'
l(') =
x'
'
b' (

1  )
  (
w

)  (1.13)
z(') =
x'
'
b' (

1  )
1  (
w

)1  (1.14)
The relative factor prices for a rm with productivity ' is independent of the
rm's productivity level, and the abatement technology and is given by,
w

=
1  

z
l
(1.15)
The substitution of equation (1.9) into (1.15) gives the optimal resource alloca-
tion as,
1  ' = 1
b'


1  
w


(1.16)
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The optimal fraction of labor devoted to production 1   depends on the level
of clean technology as well as the emission tax rate. With a cleaner technology, rms
can allocate less labor to abatement and maintain the same level of emissions. In
addition, at a given abatement technology, a stricter environmental policy reduces
the allocation of primary input (labor) to production.
Prot Maximization Problem
Consider a monopolist rm with productivity level ' that faces market demand
x('), pollution tax  , and wage rate w. The maximum one period prot function
subject to (1.8), (1.9), (1.10), and (1.11) must satisfy,
(') = maxfp;bgfp' x'   w l'    z'   c'   feg
Conditional upon remaining in operation, the rm with productivity ' chooses
the optimal abatement technology and price of intermediate good such that,
p(') = (
1
2
)pmax +
1
'
 

2 (1  )  1 2 w 1 2  2 (1.17)
1=b =  

2 (1  )  1 2 w 1 2  2 (1.18)
The optimal level of abatement technology is independent of the rm's produc-
tivity level '. Hence, all rms choose the same level of abatement technology (1=b)
in equilibrium. Prices in the market are directly associated with productivity levels
of competing rms. Hence, the rm that sets the highest price in the market is the
one with the lowest level of productivity or so called cut-o productivity '. Firms
with productivity draw below this cut-o can not stay in the market and exit. From
(1.17), the price bound is calculated,
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pmax =
2
' (1=b
)
1
2
substitution of pmax in (1.17) gives a new expression for the price in terms of
the cut-o productivity level and abatement technology.
p(') = (1=b)
1
2

1
'
+
1
'

(1.19)
Output, income, and prot of each producer are given by,
x(') =
L

(1=b)
1
2

1
'
  1
'

(1.20)
r(') =
L

(1=b)

(
1
'
)2   ( 1
'
)2

(1.21)
(') =
L

(1=b)

1
'
  1
'
2
  fe (1.22)
Equilibrium
Following Melitz (2003), and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), I assume that pro-
ductivity distribution follows the Pareto Distribution given by,9
Gm(') = 1 

m
'
k
; k > 1 (1.23)
9 The Pareto Distribution provides a good t for the observed rm size distribu-
tion, and this assumption yields closed form solutions for the productivity cut-os
and other endogenous variables of the model. The Pareto Productivity Distribution
is also used in the studies of Helpman et al. (2004) and Arkolakis et al. (2008).
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where m is the minimum possible level of productivity and k is the shift pa-
rameter. Firms only learn about their productivity levels after paying the xed cost.
Hence, the distribution of productivity conditional on entry becomes,
G'(') = 1 

'
'
k
Free Entry Condition
The free entry condition implies that any rm can pay the xed cost and enter
the market. Prior to their entry, each monopolistic producer observes their expected
prot of production and compares it to the xed entry cost. A rms enters the
market only if the expected prot is greater than the entry cost. As long as some
rms produce, the expected prot is driven to zero. Firms continue to enter until,
(1 Gm('))
R1
'' dG'(') = fe
where (1 Gm(')) is the ex post distribution of the productivity level after a
successful entry. Solving for ' gives the cut-o productivity equation,
' = 'f (1=b
)
1
k+2 (1.24)
where,
'f =

2Lmk
(k+1)(k+2)fe
 1
k+2
The cut-o productivity crucially determines the distribution of resources across
rms. The cut-o productivity threshold increases if the market becomes larger, the
emission tax goes up, the entry cost decreases, or products become less substitutable
(an increase in ). The labor market clearing condition features the distribution of
income among consumers as,
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wL = N
Z 1
'
r' dG'(') (1.25)
It is straightforward to calculate number of competing rms in equilibrium as,
N =
L
(k + 1)fe

m
'

(1.26)
In this equation, L=(k + 1)fe is the total number of entrants and m='
 is the
probability of successful entry. The number of competing rms goes up with the
size of the market. An increase in the emission tax reduces probability of successful
entry and the number of competing rms accordingly. The average productivity is
calculated as the weighted averages of the rms' productivity levels and is given by,
' =
k
k   1'

f (1=b
)
1
k+2 (1.27)
A higher emission tax has a primary impact on average productivity since rms
adopt a cleaner technology. The policy also has a secondary impact on average
productivity through selection eect (general equilibrium eect). A higher emission
tax reduces the expected prot and increases cut-o productivity. With a higher
productivity threshold, only more productive rms can enter the market and average
productivity goes up. An increase in the market size also induces a larger allocation
of labor among surviving rms which leads to an increase in the average productivity.
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Using the equation for the density function, it can be shown that the weighted
average of a rm's performance is determined by the cut-o productivity level, abate-
ment technology, and the distribution of productivity across rms. In particular, the
average price, average output, and average pollution are given by,
p =
2k + 1
k + 1
'f (1=b
)
K
k+2 (1.28)
x =
L
(k + 1)
'f (1=b
)
k
k+2 (1.29)
 =
fe
mk
'f (1=b
)
 k
k+2 (1.30)
In equations (1.28) to (1.30), the cut-o productivity completely summarizes
the performance of rms in the economy. Several results can be obtained from these
equations. The eect of market size on productivity and other performance measures
is similar to the Krugman (1980) argument. The number of rms in the industry
goes up with an increase in the market size. The larger market pushes the cut-
o productivity up which leads to the exit of less productive producers. However,
because the number of new entrants outweighs the exit rate, the average productivity
and average output (or size of each producer) is higher. In a larger market, rms set
lower prices, produce more output and make a smaller prot, all of which demonstrate
intensied competition in the economy.
Similar to the eect of market size, a lower entry fee enhances competition. With
a lower entry cost, more rms can operate in the market. The average prices and
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prots are lower but on average, rms produce less output. When products are more
substitute (smaller ), consumers only care about the overall consumption rather
than the consumption of each variety. Firms will expect lower prots and only highly
productive producers could remain in operation (selection eect). Hence, there are
less rms operating in equilibrium, and the average output and average productivity
are higher.
The eect of environmental regulation on the market is dierent. A higher emis-
sion tax encourages rms to invest in a cleaner abatement technology which has a
positive primary impact on productivity. However, regulations impose additional
cost on rms. The policy decreases the expected prot of each producer upon entry.
With a lower probability of successful entry, the cut-o productivity goes up in the
favor of higher productivity rms. Since, the total number of entrants remains un-
changed L=(k + 1)fe, fewer rms successfully enter the market. The reallocation of
resources from less productive rms to more productive rms enforces the least pro-
ductive producers to exit. The average productivity increases because less productive
producers exit the market and the surviving rms are those with highest levels of pro-
ductivity (secondary eect). Consequently, tougher environmental regulations make
the market more concentrated. The output share of each producer goes up, rms set
higher mark-ups and make larger prots. This results are consistent with the recent
empirical works of Peters (2011) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2009). De Loecker
and Warzynski (2010) examined the relationship between markups and export be-
havior using plant-level data. They show that high productivity rms (exporters)
have higher markups on average than low productivity rms.
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1.3 Welfare Analysis
Environmental policy is expected to impact social welfare though change in mar-
ket performance. The welfare of consumers in this study depends on the consumer's
preferences which features a continuum set of dierentiated goods. To get the impact
of the policy on the utility function, let's denote the variance of the market price
by var(p) and variance of the output by var(x). By standard arguments, they are
dened as,
var(p) = 1
N
R
(p'   p)2 di
var(x) = 1
N
R
(x'   x)2 di
From equation (1.4), the variance of market price can be written in terms of the
variance of output as,
var(p) = 2var(x)
The average demand for variety i produced by a rm ' is also given by x =  p
+N
.
Now, the indirect utility function is evaluated as,
U = xc0 + N x  N2

1

var(p)  x(   p)

The total of a consumer's income is denoted by Ic and it is easy to show that
Ic = xc0 +N px  N var(p). Then, the indirect utility function can be written as,
U = Ic +
N
2

1

var(p) + ( +N)x2

(1.31)
where the variance of market price is dened: var(p) = xc0 +N px  N var(p).
Equation (1.31) implies that the indirect utility function increases with a decline
in the average prices and its variance, as the consumers re-optimize their consumption
by shifting expenditures towards lower priced varieties as well as the numeraire good.
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In addition, the indirect utility function exhibits \love of variety" implying that
the welfare is enhanced by an increase in the number of varieties produced in the
economy.10
To examine the impact of an emission tax on the indirect utility function, I
substitute average price from (1.28), average output from (1.29), and variance of
market price in (1.31). With some calculation (see Appendix A), it can be shown
that,
U = Ic +
N
2


k + 1
('f )
 1(1=b)
k
k+2   2
k + 2
('f )
 2(1=b)
2k
k+2

(1.32)
Social welfare remains increasing with a lower entry cost and higher degree of
product substitution. However, an environmental policy impacts welfare through two
channels: (1) welfare is enhanced by a stricter environmental policy since regulation
induce rms to adopt a cleaner abatement technology (lower 1=b), (2) the policy
reduces welfare because a higher emission tax harms competitive environment. A
tough environmental policy leads to the exit of less productive producers (higher
'f ). The number of varieties decreases in equilibrium. The surviving rms have
10 Love of Variety was rst introduced in international trade theory by Krugman
(1980) and Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) as a monopolistic competition model. It is widely
used in general equilibrium modeling of trade ows with product dierentiation. It
assumes that a representative consumer loves variety in the sense that each additional
variety is as valuable as the last.
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more market power and set higher prices accordingly. This dominates the positive
eect of abatement technology adoption and welfare drops in the economy.
1.4 Emission Standard Policy
As it was discussed, the government can impose an emission standard policy
instead of an emission tax policy to regulate pollution. For simplicity, I assume that
only one abatement technology is available for all producers represented by b = 1. To
meet the regulations, rms are required to keep their emission-output ratio below an
exogenous level s determined by the government. The emission standard requirement
is dened as,
z'
x'
 s (1.33)
Combining this with equations (1.9) and (1.10) gives a new expression for the
pollution-output ratio as,
z'
x'
=
1
'
(1  ') 1 1  s (1.34)
Firms with a higher level of productivity naturally benet from a lower emission-
output ratio. Let us dene 's the level of productivity that just meets the emission
standard requirement. Firms with productivity below 's are not permitted by law
to operate in the market. Here 's represents the new productivity threshold.
1
's
(1  ') 1 1 = s
A monopolist producer maximizes prot p'x'   wl' subject to the joint pro-
duction technology (1.12), demand for variety (1.8), and emission ratio constraint.
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The rst order conditions determine the allocation of resources to production and
abatement according to the pricing rule given by,
p(') = 1
2

pmax + '
1
 1 s

 1w

A rm with the lowest level of productivity ('s) charges the maximum price
that consumers are willing to pay (pmax).
pmax = '
1

 1
s s

 1w (1.35)
The substitution of (1.35) back in the pricing rule gives the market price in
terms of cut-o productivity as,
p(') =
1
2
s

 1w

'
1
 1
s + '
1
 1

(1.36)
Output and prot become,
x(') =
L
2
s

 1w

'
1
 1
s   ' 1 1

(1.37)
(') =
L
2
s
2
 1w

'
1
 1
s + '
1
 1
2
(1.38)
With a tougher emission standard, rms set higher prices, produce more, and
make larger prots. Given the Pareto distribution of productivity, the free entry
condition implies that,
's =
 
Lmks
 2
1 
4(k + 1
1 )(k +
2
1 )fe
! 1 
k(1 )+2
(1.39)
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where 's is the new expression for the cut-o productivity with emission-standard
policy. The labor market clearing condition determines the equilibrium number of
rms,
N = (
m
's
)k
 
L
( 2
1 )(k +
1
1 )fe
!
(1.40)
where (m
's
)k is the probability of successful entry and the second expression is
total number of entrants to the market. A higher emission standard has no eect
on the number of new entrants but reduces the probability of successful entry and
expected prot. This increases the cut-o productivity level in favor of high pro-
ductivity rms and forces less productive producers to exit the market. The average
productivity and average market price are given by,
's =
k + 1
k
's (1.41)
p =
1
2
s

 1
 
1 +
k
k   1
 1
'
1
 1
s
!
(1.42)
Surviving rms respond to the emission-standard by setting higher prices to
maintain mark-ups. Hence, the average prices are higher with a higher emission
standard. In contrast to some studies that show that emission standards and emission
taxes have dierent impacts on a rm's performance, this study nds that both
policies enhance average productivity in the market but also harm the competitive
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environment. Thus, the impact of an emission-standard policy on welfare is similar
to the emission tax policy and is negative.11
1.5 Conclusion
This study proposed to understand the link between environmental regulations,
average productivity, and market competition. In the literature surrounding the
Porter Hypothesis, the lack of innovation is the main source of the ineciency and
a well-designed environmental policy must trigger innovation that increases produc-
tivity of individual rms and competitiveness of the economy. The results of this
study suggest that if an environmental policy leads to a higher level of productiv-
ity through induced innovation then the policy will sustain environmental quality
and competitive advantage of the economy too. However, if the productivity gain is
attributed to reallocation of resources across rms through selection eect, then, it
is important to account for the subsequent changes in the competitive environment
and social welfare.
In this study, I developed a tractable model with rm heterogeneity that incor-
porates endogenous mark-ups that respond to the toughness of competition. In the
model, average productivity is determined by distribution of rm-level productivity
11 For example, Li and Shi (2010) show critical dierences between an emission tax
and emission standard on how they aect average productivity. Their ndings state
that while an emission tax has no impact on average productivity, an emission stan-
dard policy imposes a more stringent constraint on the plants with low productivity
than on plants with high productivity.
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and allocation of resources across rms as well as the abatement technology. I as-
sessed the impact of two dierent environmental policies: an emission tax and an
emission standard. My overall ndings imply that environmental regulations induce
rms to adopt a cleaner abatement technology which improves environmental quality,
and average productivity. However, the regulations harm competitive environment
by increasing market concentration and the average prices.
Without environmental legislation enforced, abatement will not occur in the
economy and rms will have no incentive to invest in a cleaner abatement technol-
ogy. When the market is regulated, rms choose a level of clean technology so that
they could devote fewer resources to abatement activities. The cost of abatement
technology increases overall marginal cost of production and this increase in the cost
is partially passed to consumer in the form of higher average prices.
The higher marginal cost reduces expected prot of rms prior to entry. The
policy forces less productive producers to exit and the remaining inputs are reallo-
cated to more productive rms. The surviving rms in the concentrated market will
have stronger market power which enables them to set higher prices. Hence, the
market becomes more productive on average but less competitive. The welfare is
increasing with adoption of a cleaner abatement technology. However, because en-
vironmental regulation harms market competition by reducing number of operating
rms in equilibrium, the welfare goes down.
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This chapter contributes to the existing literature by studying the links between
environmental policies, measures of productivity and market competition. The re-
sults of this study also include important insights into the debates surrounding the
Porter Hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 2
Growth Accounting and Productivity Decomposition in India's Iron and
Steel Industry
2.1 Introduction
Over the past decade, a number of empirical studies have used micro-level data
to study heterogeneity in rm-level productivity and nd the proximate sources of
the low or high aggregate TFP across and within countries. In this context, a growing
body of recent literature has focused on the extent to which reallocation of capital
and labor across rms can have large eects on aggregate TFP (Hsieh and Klenow
2009, Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008).
For a deeper understanding of the proximate sources of TFP dispersion, in this
chapter, I perform a growth accounting to study the impact of the National Steel
Policy on Iron and Steel Industry in India using micro-level data. India's remarkable
growth over the last decade has made it one of the fastest growing economies in the
world and an interesting subject of study. I use plant-level data from the Indian
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) to study TFP eects of National Steel Policy
initiated in 2005 in India's Iron and Steel Industry. For a rst pass, using the ASI
plant-level data from 1999 to 2008 and the index number approach developed by
Petrin and Levinsohn (2005), I calculate aggregate industry TFP growth before and
after the policy change in 2005. Then, I decompose the aggregate TFP growth
into a within-plant eciency component and a reallocation component to nd the
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proximate sources of aggregate TFP growth. Later, in chapter three, I will use a
quantitative framework to measure the impact of the policy on industry TFP.
The results of the growth accounting show an acceleration of productivity growth
after 2005: the growth rate of aggregate TFP more than doubled, increasing from
1.72% over 1999-2004 (before the reform) to 3.61% over 2005-2008 (after the reform).
TFP decomposition also reveals that despite an increase in the share of reallocation
growth from 4.7% in 1999-2004 to 14% in 2005-2008, the largest chunk of the ag-
gregate TFP growth is attributed to the within-plant eciency component rather
than the reallocation term. In particular, within-plant eciency growth contributed
about 95% to the aggregate TFP growth in the industry before the policy change
and 86% after the policy change.
Given that the within-plant eciency is the main contributor to the aggregate
TFP growth, I consider technology change at the establishment-level as a poten-
tial engine of the productivity growth. To study the role of technology change in
aggregate TFP growth, I take into account the technologies that plants use in the
production process. The iron and steel-making technologies operated by rms in
India's Iron and Steel sector can be classied into \standard" or \ecient" technolo-
gies. The standard technology uses coal as the main fuel input while the ecient
technology uses fuels other than coal (e.g. gas and electricity). It is widely acknowl-
edged that the standard technology is less productive (less fuel-ecient) than the
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ecient technology.1 Since, the ASI data does not provide any information about
which production technology is operated at the plant-level, I use the information re-
ported by plants on their fuel expenditures to infer which technology is used by each
plant. I calculate the share of each primary input in total fuel expenditure. If a plant
used coal as a primary input and its cost accounted for at least 90% of the total fuel
expenditure in that plant, I classify the plant as a standard producer. If the plant
used one of the other primary inputs (gas, electricity of hydrocarbons) with at least
90% share in the total fuel expenditures, I classify it as an ecient plant. With this
mapping, I repeat the growth accounting and I calculate TFP growth rates and its
components (within-plant and reallocation) for units in each of the two technology
categories.
The technology-wise growth decomposition shows that the within-plant produc-
tivity growth is accounted for mainly by plants operating fuel-ecient technologies
(ecient producers) as opposed to coal-based, high-energy intensive technologies
(standard producers). In addition, the reallocation induced TFP growth after 2005
is accounted for by the initially coal-based plants. The share of the reallocation
growth in the TFP growth of the standard producers increased from 8.9% in 1999-04
to 33.9% in 2005-08.
1 See also the Technology Road-map Research Program for the Steel Indus-
try published by the American Iron and Steel Institute in 2010 and available at
www.steel.org.
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2.2 India' Iron and Steel Industry
Steel is a crucial element in the economy of developing countries and is consid-
ered as an indicator of industrial progress. The level of per capita consumption of
steel is also an important sign of socio-economic development and living standard.
In India, Iron and Steel Industry is a key sector to many small and medium
scale industries from communication to transportation and construction. The Iron
and Steel sector plays very important role in the Indian economy and contributes to
about 2% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Iron and Steel Industry in India
consists of primary (integrated) and secondary producers. The primary producers are
large rms with multiple production units that handle several production stages, from
the extraction of iron ore to the production of iron and steel. The complexity of the
production process in the integrated units requires the use of advanced technologies
that are heavily dependent on energy inputs. In contrast, the secondary producers
are smaller rms with less complicated technologies that produce relatively simple
products from low-priced materials.
Earlier development of India's Iron and Steel Industry was subject to govern-
ment control. In 1991, the industry experienced a major liberalization. Through
the industrial liberalization in India, the government removed iron and steel sector
from the list of industries reserved for the public sector and exempted it from the
provisions of compulsory licensing under the Industries Act, 1951. For many years,
the iron and steel industry was in the list of high priority industries for automatic
approval for foreign equity investment up to 51%. In 1992, the government increased
this limit to 100%. Pricing and distribution of steel also were deregulated in 1992.
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Until 1992, the major steel products were priced by the Indian government and an-
nounced by the Joint Plant Committee (JPC). Thought, not all steel items were
under immediate control of JPC, but for many producers, about 50% to 80% of
production was regulated by the JPC (Schumacher and Sathay, 1998). In 1992, the
government has gradually decontrolled prices. The distribution of steel and produc-
tion also freed from the government pricing scheme. In trade regime, import has
undergone major liberalization moving gradually to freeing imports from licensing,
canalization and lowering of import duty levels.
Through the major changes in the sector, India became the fteenth largest steel
producer in the world in 1998. It became the eighth largest crude steel producer in
2003 and now India is the fth largest crude steel producer in the world and the
world's largest producer of direct reduced iron or sponge iron.
Despite the major reforms in the Indian manufacturing sector, the Indian steel
industry is trailing behind in several areas in technology and R&D which are re-
ected in poor techno-economic performance parameters. The Indian ministry of
steel has emphasized the main problems of Iron and Steel Industry is technological
obsolescence and lack of timely modernization/renovation as well as inferior quality
of raw material and other inputs, and lack of R&D intervention.
In India similar to many developing countries, the government support are con-
sidered necessary for promoting innovation and research and development in the
steel industry. Currently, In India the investment in R&D is about 0.15% to 0.25%
of sales turnover which is way below the investment rate in the top steel makers in
the world. The Indian government plans to increase the R&D investment to at least
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1% of total turnover by 2015-16 and then to about 2% by 2020. To pursue the plan,
in 2005, the government introduced the National Steel Policy (NSP) to speed up the
development of the Iron and Steel sector. The long-term goal of the National Steel
Policy is to attain production of over 100 million tonnes per year by 2020 (from 38
million tonnes in 2005 implying a compounded annual production growth rate of 7.3
percent).2 To meet the target, the ministry of steel has taken three major initiatives
in the form of (1) capacity expansion, (2) mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures,
and (3) Research and development.
To ensure price stability of steel and steel-based products, the Indian government
has introduced new scal measures as follow:
 Import Duty on all non-alloy steel, Zinc, Ferro-alloys and metcoke revised to
'Nil' from 5% w.e.f.3
 CVED on TMT bars and rounds modied to 'Nil' from 14% w.e.f.
 15% export duty imposed on all at products withdrawn
 15% export duty imposed on Pig Iron, Sponge Iron, Scrap, Ingots and all
categories of non-alloy semi nished steel.
 Export duty on long products such as bars, wire rods, angles etc. was revised
to 15% w.e.f.
2 Crude steel production in India grew at 8% annually from 46.46 million tonnes
in 2006 to 69.57 million tonnes in 2011.
3 w.e.f: \with eect from"
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 15% ad-valorem export duty imposed on iron ore of all categories and grades
w.e.f.
 Export duty on iron ore nes has been modied to 8% w.e.f.
 5% import duty imposed on pig iron, semi-nished, at and long category of
products w.e.f.
The government also promoted capacity expansion projects in the industry
through the support of large-capacity technologies and mergers and acquisitions ini-
tiatives. For example, since 2005, many integrated producers have signed memoranda
of understanding (MoUs) with dierent states for planned capacity (mainly in the
states of Orissa, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, West Bengal, Karnataka, Gujarat and
Maharashtra). The industry had already experienced 20 million tonnes of expansion
in the nished steel manufacturing capacity during 2005-10.4 The following table
shows the 10 largest crude steel producers in 2012.
Table 2{1: Crude Steel Production, 1980-2012 (in thousand tonnes)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012
China 37121 46794 66350 95360 128500 355790 638743 716542
Japan 111395 105279 110339 101640 106444 112471 109599 107232
United States 101455 80067 89726 95191 101824 94897 80495 88695
India 9514 11936 14963 22003 26924 45780 68976 77561
Russia 51589 59136 66146 66942 70426
South Korea 8558 13539 23125 36772 43107 47820 58914 69073
Germany 43838 40497 38434 42051 46376 44524 43830 42661
Turkey 2536 4832 9443 13183 14325 20965 29143 35885
Italy 26501 23898 25467 27766 26759 29350 25750 27257
Taiwan 3365 5186 9748 11605 16896 18942 19755 20664
4 Reference: India's Ministry of Steel Annual Report.
34
2.3 Literature Review
Productivity growth of the India's manufacturing has been the subject of many
empirical studies (Dougherty et al., 2011; Besley and Burgess, 2004). In a recent
study, Bollard, Klenow, and Sharma (2013) used micro-level data to measure the
aggregate manufacturing TFP and presents evidence of a substantial speedup in
manufacturing TFP growth in India. Their estimate of the TFP growth rate was over
5 percentage points per year for 1993-2007 vs. 1980-1992. However, the overall results
of their analysis did not provide conclusive evidence on whether the liberalization
enhances productivity growth in the Indian manufacturing sector.
There are, however, only a few empirical investigations on the factors aecting
productivity in the Indian Iron and Steel sector. The results of these empirical works
are not conclusive and range from reporting improvements in measures of productiv-
ity to showing declines in the sector's productivity level. A study by Schumacher and
Sathaye (1998) using industry-level data reports that the total factor productivity
in India's Iron and Steel industry shows a downward trend of 1.71% per year from
1973-74 to 1993-94. They found that the decline was mainly because of price protec-
tive policies and the ineciency of major public steel plants. In another study, Ray
and Pal (2010) used industry-level data and conducted a productivity comparison
of before and after liberalization in the period of 1980-92 and 1992-04. Their study
shows evidence of improvement in partial productivity measures (labor and capital)
after liberalization (1992-2004) but the results of overall productivity performance
show declining TFP growth. They found that the signicant output growth in India's
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Iron and Steel industry was mainly input-driven rather than productivity-driven and
that resource misallocation is the major obstacle to productivity growth.
The next section represents a growth accounting and productivity decomposition
approach. I calculate the industry TFP and its components for the period of 1999 to
2008. The plant-level data from ASI are used to calculate aggregate industry TFP
and productivity decomposition.
2.4 Framework
Following Basu and Fernald (2002) and Petrin and Levinsohn (2005), I used an
index number approach to calculate TFP growth rates and then I decomposed it into
a within-plant eciency component and a reallocation component over 1999-2008, as
well as both before and after the policy change in 2005. The index number approach
is a straightforward method of calculating TFP and its components without any
estimation (Biesebroeck, 2007).
The main advantage of the index number approach is that it enables researchers
to handle multiple outputs and inputs cases while exible and heterogeneous pro-
duction technology is allowed. The other advantage of the index number approach is
that there is no need to any estimation and all the measures are computed straight-
forward.
To start, consider the following production technology used by plant i at time
t:
Qit = H(Ait; Xijt; Eiet)
I denoted Qit as the maximum quantity of gross output that can be produced by
plant i at time t using primary and intermediate inputs. Primary inputs X indexed
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by j include skilled labor Ls, unskilled labor Lu, and capital K. Intermediate inputs
indexed by e include basic materials M and fuel F . The value-added function Yit
represents the maximum amount of current-price value-added that is produced by
plant i, given a set of primary inputs, and its shadow prices Px. Ait denotes plant
level productivity parameter, wu and ws denote wage rate for unskilled and skilled
labor, and R denotes interest rate.
Yit = F (Ait; Xijt) (2.1)
Lets small letters represent natural logarithms. The aggregate TFP growth in
the industry based on value-added is dened as,
dat = dyt   dxt (2.2)
where dyt and dxt are aggregate growth rates of value-added output and primary
inputs.
The aggregate TFP growth can be decomposed into a within-plant eciency
growth component and a reallocation growth component of each primary input.
dat = TE + RELu + RELs + REK (2.3)
where,
TE =
P
i
Pit Yit dait
Pt Yt
RELu =
P
i (w
u
it wut )Luit dLuit
PxtXt
RELs =
P
i (w
s
it wst )Lsit dLsit
PxtXt
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REK =
P
i (rit  rt)Kit dKit
PxtXt
and PxtXt stands for total input expenditures.
PxtXt =
P
iw
u
it L
u
it +
P
iw
s
it L
s
it +
P
i ritKit
here Yit denotes the nominal value-added of plaint i and dait denotes plant level
TFP growth. TE is within-plant eciency growth and is calculated as the weighted
average of plant eciency growth rates. Pit Yit
Pt Yt
is share of rm i in the industry
nominal value-added. RE's reveal reallocation growth resulted from each primary
input. The reallocation terms reect reallocation of each primary input to plants
that have a shadow price larger than the average industry input price. Since the
plant-level input prices are not observable, I calculate the aggregate TFP growth
rate and within-plant eciency growth rate rst. The residual dierence between
the two terms gives the overall reallocation component.
To calculate within-plant eciency growth, rst, I approximated the plant-level
productivity growth dait from:
dait = dyit   Luit dLuit   Lsit dLsit   Kit dKit (2.4)
In this equation, dyit denotes the plant value-added growth rate which is cal-
culated from the Divisia value-added growth formula and the Tornqvist Index as
follows.5
5 The Tornqvist index is a discrete approximation to calculate growth rates. For
a Tornqvist index, the growth rates are dened to be the dierence in natural loga-
rithms of successive observations of the plants. The weights are equal to the mean
of the factor shares of the components in aggregate output.
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dyit =
dqit   mit dMit   fit dFit
1  mit   fit
(2.5)
where, jit is the share of primary input j in the output of a plant i at time t
and is given by,
jit =
jit+
j
it 1
2
, j 2 flu; ls; kg
and, eit is share of intermediate input e in output of a plant i at time t, given
by,
eit =
eit+
e
it 1
2
, e 2 fm; fg
All the growth rates are calculated as dierence in natural logarithms. For
example, for capital, the dKit is given by,
dKit = ln(Kit)   ln(Kit 1)
2.5 Data
The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) is the main source of industrial statistics
in India. The ASI provides a variety of information on the value of output, assets
(capital), employment and wages, value and types of materials and fuels at plant
level. The ASI sampling frame includes all registered factories employing 10 or more
workers using power, or factories with 20 or more workers without power. Production
units in the survey are coded based on the National Industrial Classication (NIC).
To extract the Iron and Steel sector from ASI, I use the NIC 1998 and NIC 2004.
Under both industrial classication codes, basic metal products are classied under
division 27, and group 271 which represents Iron and Steel products. With this, I
can construct a sample of 1200 production units on average per year representing
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Indian Iron and Steel sector. The details of Iron and Steel products under division
27 are provided in Appendix B.
Table 2{2: Average Number of Plants Per Year in Total Sample
1999-2004 2005-2008 1999-2008
Number of Plants 950 1590 1200
The set of manufacturing units covered in every survey is called the \census"
while rest of the units, which are chosen randomly, are treated as the \sample".
Census units for the period of 1999-04 include all manufacturing units with 200
employees or more, plus units with fewer than 200 employees but with signicant
contribution to the value of output, as well as all units in 12 industrially backward
states. The denition of the census sample has been changed since 2005 and now
covers units with 100 or more employees plus all the plants in the ve industrial
backward states (see Appendix C for more information on ASI sampling design).
To have a reliable panel, this study uses both \census" and \sample" units between
1999 and 2008. The nal sample includes 60% of sample units and 40% of census
units. Figure 2.1 also shows the share of census units in the nal sample.
The growth accounting undertaken in this study requires observations on indi-
vidual production units every two consecutive years (t and t 1). In the ASI prior to
2005, plants were not assigned a unique identication number, so, it is not possible
to link up directly the plant observations for every two years. So, I used a match-
ing procedure following Bollard, Klenow, and Sharma (2013) to link production units
across every two years from 1999 to 2005. I used information on several identication
variables which are reported on a consistent basis every year. These include the year
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Figure 2{1: Number of Units in Census Sample vs. Total Sample
of initial production, state code, district code, sector code, type of organization, and
type of ownership. The initial year of production and state code remain unchanged
over time. I matched plants based on the initial year of production rst. Dropping
unmatched observations, I linked plants with the second identication variable (state
code). This procedure was continued for the rest of the identication variables. To
minimize possible errors, I ensured that for the plants in the nal sample, the closing
value of xed assets was close to the opening value of the next year. The nal sample
contains plants that were matched based on at least 3 identication variables. To
reduce the eect of spurious outliers, observations with extreme values were dropped
from the sample. By the matching procedure, between 40-60% of units are matched
on average in every two consecutive years.
At the aggregate and plant-level, I measure output as total value of output.
I also use total mandays worked of workers to measure unskilled labor and total
mandays worked of managers and supervisors to measure skilled labor. Capital is
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Figure 2{2: Percentage of Matched Plants to Previous Year Record
measured as the value of xed assets. Materials and energy inputs are measures by
total their expenditures.
All the values in the data are deated based on the price indexes provided by
the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy published by the \Reserve Bank
of India". In particular, the value of output was deated with a price index for
\basic materials and alloy industries". The material was deated by the price index
of intermediate goods, and each fuel (coal, gas, electricity and hydrocarbons) was
deated by its own price index.
2.6 Productivity Growth Decomposition
Table 2.3 outlines the aggregate TFP growth rates and the share of reallocation
growth in the growth rates. All the growth rates are reported as yearly average. The
industry TFP grows averaged 1.72% over 1999-04, 3.61% over 2005-08 and 2.56%
over the whole period of 1999-08. The within-plant eciency was the main source
of productivity gain in the industry both before and after the policy change and it
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accounts for over 95% of the aggregate TFP growth in 1999-04. However, reallocation
plays a higher role (15% of the aggregate TFP growth) after the policy change.
Table 2{3: TFP Growth Rates and Decomposition(%)
Period 1999-04 2005-08 1999-08
Aggregate Productivity 1.72 3.61 2.56
Share of within-plant eciency 95.3 86.1 89.6
Share of Reallocation 4.7 13.9 10.4
What was the underlying cause of within-plant eciency growth in India's Iron
and Steel industry? Given that the sector was highly technology-dependent, a nat-
ural candidate for the acceleration of within-plant eciency growth is technological
progress. In the ASI data, plants do not report the types of technology that they
use in production, therefore, it is impossible to observe directly if there has been any
change in technology use over time. However, Iron and Steel making processes are
extremely intensive in material and energy usage. A wide range of Iron and Steel
making technologies are characterized by the types of primary fuel input. Plant
operators are forced to choose a technology that makes their production facilities
energy-ecient. The answer to the question of which technology is appropriate lies
in the cost and quality of fuel inputs as well as the capacity of the production unit.
Knowing these requirements helps managers to decide, for instance, if a coal-based
furnace should be used in production or an electric arc furnace.6
6 Fuel in some technologies constitutes up to 50% of the total production cost.
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So, I used expenditures of primary fuel input as a proxy to infer the production
technologies in the industry. Coal is a plentiful and cheap source of fuel in India and
coal-based technologies are relatively less expensive but important to produce low-
priced Iron and Steel products. Coal-based technologies are inecient and outdated
compared to alternative technologies that use an ecient fuel like gas, hydrocarbons,
or electricity.7 As a rst pass, I calculated the share of each primary fuel input in
total fuel expenditures and classied the plants that use coal as a primary input
as standard plants and plants that use other fuels (natural gas, hydrocarbons, or
electricity) as ecient plants. With this technology split, the standard technology
becomes the less productive technology (less fuel-ecient) than the ecient technol-
ogy but less expensive too.
This classication may not represent the entire technological features of the
industry, but it is consistent with the Iron and Steel making process in India. For
example, in the iron-making step, iron ore is reduced to either pig iron (low quality
iron) or sponge iron (high quality iron). Pig iron production occurs in Blast Furnaces
(BF) where coal is the primary fuel (this is classied as standard technology). \Direct
Reduced" is an alternative technology that produces sponge iron using fossil fuels
(this is classied as the ecient technology). The conversion of ore into pig iron is
more energy-intensive and less ecient than conversion of iron ore to sponge iron.
7 For detailed information about steel production technologies, energy consump-
tion and their eciencies, see the Technology Road-map Research Program for the
Steel Industry published by American Iron and Steel Institute in 2010 and available
at www.steel.org.
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The steel production step also involves two main technologies: Open Hearth Furnace
(OHF) and Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF). OHF is an old technology with high capital
costs and fuel consumption. In an OHF process, over 90% of the fuel comes from
coal, 3%-4% percent from gas and 1%-2% from liquid fuels (OHF is classied as the
standard technology). In contrast, BOF is a newer technology with higher eciency.
The main energy input in BOF process is gas or combination of gas and other fuels
(this is classied as the ecient technology). A typical technology change would be to
switch from one technology to another. For example, in many steel producing units
in India, Open Hearth Furnaces have been shutdown or replaced by the alternative
technologies (e.g. Basic Oxygen Furnace) which leads to a decrease in the average
share of crude steel production by OHF from 16.6% over 1990-04 to 2% over 2005-08
(see Appendix D for more information about iron and steel making technologies).
Next, I recalculated the TFPs and their components for plants with standard
and eciency technologies. The following table shows the results. Plants with the
ecient technology grew signicantly faster during 2005-08 with an average growth
rate of 5.33% per year compared to 1.89% in 1999-04. While, producers with the
standard technology experience a decline in average productivity growth rate from
1.16% per year in the rst period to -0.61% over 2005-08. For the both types of
plants, within-rm eciency remains as the main source of productivity growth.
However, for the standard producers, the share of reallocation has increased from
8.9% in 1999-04 to 33.9% during 2005-08 indicating a large reallocation of inputs
across standard producers and between plants with dierent technologies.
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Table 2{4: Technology-wise TFP Growth and Decomposition(%)
1999-04 2005-08 1999-08
Standard Producers Aggregate Productivity 1.16 -0.61 0.37
Share of within-plant eciency 91.1 66.1 90.7
Share of Reallocation 8.9 33.9 9.3
Ecient Producers Aggregate Productivity 1.89 5.33 3.42
Share of within-plant eciency 97.3 93.0 94.3
Share of Reallocation 2.7 7.0 5.7
An important statistic that can be observed from the technology-wise growth
accounting is the gap in the growth rates of plants with dierent technologies both
before and after the policy change. While all the production units grew at slightly
dierent rates before the policy change (1.16% vs. 1.89%), the acceleration of TFP
growth of ecient plants along with declining TFP growth of standard plants, in-
creased productivity growth gap between standard and ecient producers. This gap
has increased from 0.73% in 1999-04 to 5.94% in 2005-08.
Figure 2{3: Gap in TFP Growth Rates of Standard and Ecient Plants
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2.7 Conclusion
My quantitative analysis in this chapter provides supporting evidence that plants
with more productive technologies have experienced a larger TFP growth after 2005
while there is also a large reallocation of resources across plans with less productive
technologies. My results indicate that technological change might be a possible cause
of the TFP growth in the sector after 2005 and the National Steel Policy introduced
in 2005 and in particular its subsidy program could be the reason that encouraged
plants to adopt more productive technologies. However, my results, cannot pro-
vide conclusive evidence if the subsidy program is an important contributor to the
changes in TFP growth rates. In addition, it is important to examine if the policy
generated distortions and led to misallocation eect that could potentially shave a
part of productive growth through misallocation of resources across plants with dif-
ferent productivity. In the next chapter, I am going to quantitatively measure the
misallocation eect and its potential negative impact on productivity. I will develop
a empirical framework to assess if the subsidy policy has led to misallocation of re-
sources across plants and if it is also quantitatively important in accounting for the
changes in TFP growth rates and the gap between plants with dierent technologies.
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CHAPTER 3
Innovation Subsidies: Misallocation and Technology Upgrade
3.1 Introduction
It is well understood that total factor productivity (TFP) plays a major role
in understanding the dierences in income levels between rich and poor countries,
as well as in accounting for growth miracles and growth disasters within countries.
An important follow-up question is, what are the proximate sources of low or high
aggregate TFP? Broadly speaking, macroeconomists have emphasized two types of
explanations in accounting for aggregate TFP, both across countries and within in-
dividual countries over time: (a) how productivity is determined at the plant-level
(e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Parente and Prescott (1994, 1999), and (b) how ag-
gregate resources are allocated across plants of a given productivity (e.g., Restuccia
and Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). At a deeper level, we would like to
understand what particular policies and frictions lead to changes in productivity at
the plant-level or cause misallocation.
In recent years, there has been substantial progress in measuring the extent
of misallocation and quantifying its importance for aggregate TFP, as well as in
assessing the quantitative importance of specic factors leading to misallocation (see
Restuccia and Rogerson, 2013 for an excellent survey of this literature). However,
only a few studies exist on policies that cause misallocation but also induce changes
in productivity at the plant-level. In this chapter, I ask what are the aggregate TFP
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eects of a subsidy policy that generates misallocation across plants while at the same
time induces certain plants to adopt more productive technologies? Answering this
question requires the use of establishment-level data in an environment in which the
policy change is directly observed. My focus in this chapter is on a particular policy
in a specic industry, in which the link between observed policy and productivity
outcomes is tight. I use plant-level data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI)
to study the aggregate TFP eects of a subsidy program in India's Iron and Steel
sector.
Here, I examine whether the 2005 subsidy program was an important under-
lying contributor to the aggregate TFP changes in India's Iron and Steel Industry,
and if it was, through what channels did it manifest itself. In order to assess quan-
titatively how important the reform was in generating the industry TFP growth, I
develop a simple general equilibrium model of rm heterogeneity with the possibility
of technology upgrade at the establishment-level. In particular, I extended the Lucas
(1978) span-of-control model to include a technology choice at the establishment-level
along the lines of Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014b). In this model, individuals
draw their managerial ability from an invariant and known distribution, and choose
whether to become entrepreneurs and operate plants or become employees work-
ing at the plants. When setting up an establishment, each entrepreneur has access
to two technologies: a \standard" technology and an \ecient" technology. The
ecient technology has higher TFP but requires a higher xed cost of operation
relative to the standard technology. Aggregate TFP is determined by the allocation
of individuals across occupations (hired workers vs. entrepreneurs), the allocation
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of resources across establishments, and the technology selection of entrepreneurs.
In the absence of any distortions, individuals will optimally sort themselves across
occupations and technologies, with the highest ability individuals operating ecient
technology plants, intermediate ability individuals operating standard technology
plants, and low ability individuals working as employees at both types of plants.
The equilibrium is characterized by two cut-o levels of ability, where the lowest
determines who becomes a worker vs. entrepreneur (occupational choice) and the
second determines who operates the standard vs. ecient technology (technology
choice). In other words, for a given distribution of managerial ability, the undistorted
equilibrium implies an ecient distribution of plant sizes and technology usage. The
ecient distribution of plant sizes and technologies can be observed from the ASI
data which shows that the average number of workers in the ecient plants was 610
compared to the standard plants (268) before the policy change.
Introducing a non-uniform subsidy policy in this framework with endogenous
technology choice will generate three direct eects. First, holding xed the number
of plants operating each technology, the subsidy introduces idiosyncrasy in the prices
faced by individual producers, causing a reallocation of resources from non-subsidized
to subsidized plants (misallocation eect). Second, the plants that receive the subsi-
dies are motivated to switch to the ecient technology (technology upgrade eect).
While the misallocation eect would tend to reduce aggregate industry TFP, the
technology upgrade eect would tend to raise it. In addition, through general equi-
librium eects, the division of individuals between workers and entrepreneurs also
impacts aggregate industry TFP (selection eect). More specically, the threshold
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for occupational choice increases and the threshold for technology choice decreases
in response to the subsidy policy. Which eect dominates is a quantitative question.
To quantify the eects of the subsidy policy, I calibrate the model to India's
Iron and Steel industry prior to the policy change in 2005. Then, I introduce subsidy
policy as being proportional to output. I assume that the subsidies are nanced
through a lump-sum tax on consumers. I chose the subsidy rates to match the
government spending as a percentage of annual turnover of iron and steel producers
in India. In the calibrated model, the size-dependent nature of the subsidies is
captured by allowing only plants with labor input above an exogenously set level
to receive the subsidies. In India's Iron and Steel sector, large plants with multi-
unit production facilities were the main participants in the subsidy program. In line
with this, I set the exogenous employment cut-o for the subsidized plants to the
minimum employment size of multi-unit plants before the policy change.
The misallocation eect can be captured in the above framework if the technol-
ogy choice of entrepreneurs is shutdown. If all plants use the standard technology,
the size-dependent subsidies distort only the occupation decisions of individuals, im-
plying a misallocation of resources across/between large and small production units
(level-eect). In this environment, the model predicts that the size-dependent sub-
sidies lead to a small decrease in aggregate TFP.
However, when individuals and plants are permitted to self-select, I show that
the size-dependent subsidies distort both the occupation decision of individuals and
the technology choice of entrepreneurs. The misallocation eect still generates ag-
gregate TFP loss, however, the policy induces technology upgrading at plant level
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which increases the marginal benet of production and does so more for the high
TFP/ecient technology producers than it does for the low TFP/standard produc-
ers. As a result, marginal plants that used to operate with the standard technology
upgrade to the ecient technology. The positive impact of technology upgrading
is high enough to increase the aggregate industry TFP. The calibrated model with
technology choice predicts that the size-dependent subsidies increase the industry
TFP growth rate by 0.63%-0.71% which explains 16%-21% of the aggregate TFP
growth observed from data. The model also does well in predicting the gap in TFP
growth rates of standard and ecient producers: the policy accounts for 44%-56% of
the gap in TFP growth rates of plants with dierent technology. The source of the
change in the industry TFP growth rate is accounted for by the misallocation eect
(-2%), the technology upgrade eect (49%), and the selection eect (53%).
3.2 Literature Review
The existence of large and persistent per capita income dierences across rich
and poor countries has attracted many theoretical and empirical studies. In the
last two decades, establishment-level data have become available and economists
have increasingly used it to better understand the sources of productivity dierences
across/within countries. The focus of the emerging literature using micro-level data
has been to make inferences about aggregate economic performance through the lens
of heterogeneity at the establishment-level.
Among many factors at establishment-level that might be important in account-
ing for the dispersion of aggregate TFPs, two factors are most prominent. A country
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might be less productive because rms in that country use less productive technolo-
gies. Or, rms may have the frontier technologies, but without sucient knowledge
and skills, they are unable to operate the technologies eciently. In this respect,
the dierence in the use of technology at the establishment-level is the source of low
aggregate TFP (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Parente and Prescott, 1994).
However, aggregate TFP depends not only on the dispersion of individual estab-
lishments, but also on how aggregate resources are allocated across them. The opti-
mal resource allocation requires equalization of marginal products at the establishment-
level. Idiosyncratic distortions can change relative prices faced by individual rms
and alter the equalization of marginal returns to production factors at the establishment-
level. This deviation leads to a sub-optimal resource allocation (or the so-called
misallocation) which reduces the overall levels of output and aggregate productivity.
Figure 3.1 illustrates misallocation eect generated from an inecient allocation of
labor across two rms. The unequal marginal products of labor across the two rms
leads to an output loss. This view of the low aggregate productivity has received a
great deal of attention recently by a large branch of the macroeconomics literature
(e.g. see Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008, and, Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
There are many underlying factors which are thought to be important causes of
misallocation. For example, the cost of ring employees in large establishments, fa-
vorable loans to local rms, the political connections of state-owned corporations, -
nancial frictions such as the extra borrowing costs for small rms, and size-dependent
taxes or subsidies { all can potentially lead to misallocation.
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Figure 3{1: Labor Misallocation Eect
Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) provide an excellent survey of empirical studies
on misallocation and identify two dierent types. The rst set of empirical studies
tries to understand the underlying factors that cause misallocation by considering
one or more particular policies or institutions to examine the channel through which
misallocation is generated, and then by quantifying the overall impact of misalloca-
tion on aggregate outcomes and rm performance. A study by Guner et al. (2008)
considers policies that aect the size of establishments with a focus on the regula-
tion of the retail sector in Japan and France, employment protection in Italy, and
subsidies for small and medium size enterprises in Korea. Their study indicates that
policies that reduce the average size of establishments by 20% lead to reductions in
output and output per establishment up to 8.1% and 25.6% respectively, as well as
a large increase in the number of establishments (23.5%).
Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014a) looked at the 1988 Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) in the Philippines, that capped farm size at a legislated
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ceiling and the 1976 Amendment to the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act which
imposed a progressive tax on farm sizes. Their quantitative assessment reports that
the land reform in the Philippines reduced average size and agricultural productivity
by 7%, while the tax reform in Pakistan reduced size and productivity by 3%.
In a study on capital market imperfections, Gilchrist et al. (2012) measures
the extent of misallocation through borrowing costs of rms in a sub-set of the U.S.
manufacturing sector from interest rate spreads on their outstanding publicly-traded
debt. Their ndings show that the resource loss due to the nancial market frictions
leads to relatively a small TFP decline of 1.5 to 3.5 percent.
Given the wide array of policies and institutions that can generate misallocation,
another set of papers focus on \wedges" rather than specic policies and institutions.
In this case, the overall eect of misallocation is the object of interest. Within this
literature the well-known paper by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) shows that resource
misallocation has led to sizable gaps in marginal products of labor and capital across
plants within narrowly-dened industries in China and India compared to the U.S.
Their quantitative results report that moving to the U.S. eciency increases TFP in
China by 30-50% and TFP in India by 40-60%. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) also
examine policies that create heterogeneity in the prices faced by individual rms and
then measure the potential extent of output loss due to misallocation. They nd
that such policies can result to 30% decreases in output and aggregate TFP.
Bello, et al. (2011) studied the link between misallocation and growth collapse
in Venezuela after the late 1950s. Their study points out many policies and insti-
tutions that misallocated resources to unproductive establishments, and shows that
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misallocation can explain most of the decrease in TFP and capital accumulation
observed in Venezuela relative to the United States during the collapse period.
While in many studies, the impact of misallocation on aggregate output and
TFP is measured holding the value of the establishment-level productivity xed or
exogenously given, a recent study by Gabler and Poschke (2013) evaluates distortions
that not only generate misallocation but also impact the distribution of rm-level
productivity. According to their framework, in absence of distortions, rms engage
in costly experiments that can promote their productivity level. However, if high
productivity rms are subject to distortions (tax), rms have no incentive to invest in
purposeful experiments. In this case, the overall impact of misallocation on aggregate
productivity is larger because the distortions not only misallocate resources across
rms but also it discourage them from investing in experiments that could lead to
an increase in the level of productivity.
In this chapter, I measure the quantitative impact of a policy that even though
generates misallocation, it incentivizes technology upgrading at the establishment
level. In particular, I consider the misallocation generated from the subsidy program
in the Iron and Steel sector in India in 2005. In this sector, the subsidy program
was the main source of nancial support for innovation activities focused on the
improvement of existing technologies, energy eciency, and input upgrading. While
in principle the allocation of subsidies was open to all rms, in practice the subsi-
dies were eectively size-dependent, as they were only given to large Iron and Steel
producers. The non-uniform distribution of subsidies creates heterogeneity in id-
iosyncratic prices faced by individual producers and led to misallocation. In contrast
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to the study of Gabler and Poschke (2013), in which distortions discourage pro-
ductivity improvements at the establishment-level, the subsidy program in Indian
Iron and Steel sector provided incentives for technology upgrade activities at the
establishment-level1 .
3.3 National Steel Policy
Successful transition to a modern and ecient steel industry requires techno-
logical progress. In terms of innovation and technological change, the iron and steel
companies in India have a relatively small investment in R&D compared to the top
steel producers in the world. For instance, China, as the world largest steel producer,
invests in R&D more than all the investment made by rest of the world combined.
To spur technological progress, the draft NSP initiated sustained budgetary support
of of various innovation and technology improvement activities in the industry.2
1 The literature has stressed several reasons for why small rms participate less
frequently in support programs than large rms. The level of rms' participation in
a subsidy program is determined by the government decision to distribute the funds
and implicitly, by the rm's decision to apply for the funds. For example, Heijs and
Herrera (2004) discuss that small rms suer from limitations of human resource
and they often do not have enough time to prepare application forms or to gather
information about various kinds of nancial aids from the public administration. A
prime empirical example is the study by Hanel (2003) on the eect of innovation sup-
port programs by the Canadian government on manufacturing rms. Hanel shows
that small rms participated in the R&D less frequently than large rms. In addi-
tion, a limited capacity of innovation management in small rms could have delayed
the conversion of their innovation activities into well-organized projects with clear
objectives which is necessary to apply for the funds.
2 According to the World Steel Association, eciency improvements could lead to
reductions of up to 50 percent of energy required to produce a tonne of crude steel.
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According to information provided by India's Ministry of Steel, since 2005, the gov-
ernment has allocated around 20 to 40 million dollars per year to nance well-dened
projects in various areas such as input upgrading, reduction in energy consumption,
and technology progress. In addition to these direct funds, the ministry organized
particular sessions and constituted a \Task Force" to review the existing institutional
infrastructure available for research and development in steel producers. The task
force was to determine the existing shortages and set up an advanced R&D center
to utilize domestically available resources. For example, under this program, rms
could receive a one-time grant of 10 million dollars during the rst three years and
the full establishment cost of a virtual center for R&D activities. In addition, the
government approved a new scheme called the \Scheme for Promotion of R&D in
Iron & Steel Sector" for which an additional amount of 25 million dollar has been
allocated for the period of 2007-12.
Table 3{1: R&D investment (as % of turnover) in the Main Indian Steel Companies
2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
SAIL 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.24
RINL 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.12
Tata Steel 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.21
JSPL 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 n.a.
Essar Steel 0.045 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.17
JSW Steel 0.13 0.09 0.067
An review of the R&D investment in Steel companies abroad shows that research
and development activities in the top steel producers particularly in China, Japan
and South Korea is quite dierent. Not only the companies are equipped with
full-edged in-house R&D laboratory, they also have visible tie-up with external
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laboratories and Academic institutions with large outlay of funds earmarked for
R&D. Naturally, annual R&D investment is very high and reportedly varies in the
range of 1-2% of their turnover. The following table shows R&D investment as
percentage of sales in the top steel producers in the world.
Table 3{2: R&D Expenditure of Global Steel Companies as percent of sales turnover(%)
Company Name Country 2008-09 2009-10
Nippon Steel Japan 0.9 1.0
JFE Japan 1.1 1.1
POSCO South Korea 1.2 1.3
Thyssen Krupp Germany 0.6 0.7
KOBE Steel Japan 1.4 1.4
Arcelor Mittal Luxembourg 0.2 0.4
Sumitomo Metal Japan 1.2 1.2
Boa Steel China 1.2 1.7
The innovation subsidy policy has been used to promote iron and steel industry
in China and Japan too. In Japan, in order to catch up with the advanced countries,
in 1951 the government introduced the \First Iron and Steel Rationalization Plan"
with focus on technological change and R&D. The \First Iron and Steel Rational-
ization Plan" was followed by the \Second Iron and Steel Rationalization Plan" in
1956. The focus of the second plan was the introduction of the basic oxygen furnace
(BOF), which was a substitute for the open hearth furnace. A study by Ohashi
(2005) shows that the subsidy policy had a signicant impact on growth rate of the
industry.
3.4 A Model of Plant Size and Technology Choice
I considered a standard version of the Lucas (1978) span-of-control industry
model. Each individual in the economy is endowed with a set of skills to become
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an entrepreneur. The skills can be considered as variety of someone's experience of
dierent industries, companies, and technologies. The set of skills (or managerial
talent) is xed across time but varies across individuals. As in the standard span-of-
control model, entrepreneurs tend to have more skills than employees. Occupation
choice decision depends on an individual's level of skills and is determined by a
comparison of benets from being an entrepreneur (producer) versus a paid worker.
Each individual that chooses to become entrepreneur will represent one production
unit (plan) and in total they create an industry with heterogeneous producers. In
this framework, the size of each establishment is endogenous and depends on the
managerial ability of its entrepreneur.
To incorporate an endogenous technology change, I extend the Lucas span-of-
control model to include a technology choice at the establishment-level along the lines
of Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014b). When an individual decides to become an
entrepreneur, he/she has access to two technologies, a \standard" technology and an
\ecient" technology. The two technologies dier in terms of TFP and xed cost.
In particular, the ecient technology is more productive but it requires a higher
xed cost relative to the standard technology. In this framework, the aggregate TFP
is determined by the allocation of individuals across occupations, the allocation of
resources across establishments, and the choice of technology use of entrepreneurs.
Without distortions, there is an optimal allocation of individuals across two oc-
cupations (working vs. entrepreneurship) and allocation of ecient and standard
technology across plants. The equilibrium is characterized by two cut-o levels of
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ability, where the lowest determines who becomes a worker vs. entrepreneur (occu-
pational choice) and the upper threshold determines who operates the standard vs.
the ecient technology (technology choice).
To start, consider an industry that has a given quantity of homogenous capital
K and a given labor-force La = 1. The individual's level of skills s is drawn from
an exogenous and time invariant distribution function represented by cdf G(s) and
pdf g(s).
The initial allocation of resources involves a division of labor-force into work-
ers L and the rest to entrepreneurs Lp. To operate, a plant with productivity level
s must choose either the standard technology with productivity parameter n and
technology-specic cost cn, or, the ecient technology with productivity parameter
m and technology-specic cost cm while m > n and cm > cn. Then, the estab-
lishment employs an ecient amount of capital k(s), and labor l(s) and produces
output according to a decreasing return to scale technology given by,
yi(s) = (is)
1  (ki(s) li(s)1 ); i 2 fn;mg; m > n (3.1)
where  is the span-of-control, s is plant-level productivity parameter,  is
capital's share in output, and  is the technology-specic parameter. A plant with
productivity s and technology i maximizes prot with a given market wage rate w
and rental rate of capital r.
i(s) = max fyi   w li(s)  r ki(s)  cig
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where ci is the xed cost of technology i and is measured in units of output.
Plants are competitive in output and factor markets. Conditional on operating, the
rst order conditions give demands for labor and capital as,
ki(s) = (
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1  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1  
1
1  i s (3.2)
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1 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All plants have the same capital-labor ratio which is independent of the plant
productivity level s, and the technology-productivity parameter . This result is
consistent with the data. Calculation of capital-labor ratio for the Iron and Steel
Industry from ASI data also shows that the average capital-labor ratio before and
after the policy change in 2005 are 0.1034 and 0.1049.
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r
w
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Since the demands for labor and capital are linear in productivity parameter
s, output and prot at plant level remain linear in s too. This implies that large
establishments are operated by entrepreneurs with the higher level of managerial
skills.
yi(s) = (

r
)

1  (
1  
w
)
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1  i s (3.5)
i(s) = (1  ) yi(s)  ci
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Decisions
In a stationary environment, the ecient allocation of individuals between work-
ers and entrepreneurs is determined by a comparison of the job market wage rate w
and the prot earned under the standard production technology n(sn). The condi-
tion yields a threshold level of skills sn at which, an individual becomes indierent to
whether they become a hired worker or an entrepreneur. This lower level of threshold
is calculated,
n(sn) = w (3.6)
The second threshold of skills sm is determined by a comparison of expected
prots earned as a producer with the standard technology and a producer with the
ecient technology.
n(sn) = m(sm) (3.7)
Note that in equilibrium and in the absence of any distortions, individuals will
optimally sort themselves across occupations and technologies. Individuals with the
highest level of ability operate ecient technology plants, individuals with interme-
diate level of ability run the standard technology plants, and individuals with the
lowest level of ability work as employees at the both types of plants. The undistorted
equilibrium also implies an ecient distribution of plant sizes and technology usage.
Subsidy Policy and Industry TFP
Let us assume that the government introduces a subsidy policy and each plant
is subject to a subsidy to output (s). Since the policy aims to promotes large units,
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only plants with number of workers above a threshold can receive the subsidies. I
dene l the cut-o employment threshold for subsidized plants. l is exogenous and is
determined by the government. Producers with standard or ecient technology can
receive the subsidies as long as their employment size is above l. The subsidy rate
remains xed as long as the plant is in operation.
(s) = 0, if li < l
The policy changes the prot maximization problem of subsidized plants and
their demands for capital and labor. Given the wage rate w and the rental price of
capital r, the prot maximization problem of a rm s with technology i changes to,
i(s) = maxf(1 + (s)) yi   w li(s)  r ki(s)  cig
The distortions generated from the size-dependent subsidies alter plant-level
decisions and impact optimal allocation of resources across plants as well the optimal
technology selections. It can be shown that the lower threshold of skills becomes,
sn =
w + cn
(1 + (s)n)
1
1  (1  )n
(

r
)
 
1  (
1  
w
)
 (1 )
1  
 
1  (3.8)
where (s)n is the subsidy rate to plants with productivity s and technology n. A
lower wage rate or a higher subsidy rate increase expected prot of entrepreneurship
and reduce the lower threshold of skills sn. This motivates marginal workers with the
highest level of ability to enter the industry and become entrepreneurs. A subsidy
policy has no eect on the prot of standard plants with productivity below the kink
point but increase the market wage rate. The policy leads to an increase in the lower
threshold of skills such that the least productivity entrepreneurs leave the industry
and become hired workers.
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The upper threshold of skills also changes to,
sm =
cm   cn
(1  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 
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(3.9)
where (s)m denotes the subsidy rate faced by producers s and technology m.
A subsidy policy encourages marginal entrepreneurs with standard technology to
switch to the ecient technology.
Market Clearing Conditions
In equilibrium, there exist two types of establishments: high productivity en-
trepreneurs who operate larger plants using the ecient technology and entrepreneurs
with lower level of productivity who run smaller plants using the standard technol-
ogy. The aggregate demands for capital and labor are determined by wage rate w,
rental rate of capital r and the productivity distribution condition on entry (condi-
tional productivity distribution) gc(s). Setting the maximum level of skills at smax,
the sum of the capital employed by standard and ecient plants gives the aggregate
capital in the industry.
K = Kn +Km =
smX
sn
kn(s) gc(s) +
smaxX
sm
km(s) gc(s) (3.10)
The aggregate labor employed by standard and ecient plants are given by,
L = Ln + Lm =
smX
sn
ln(s) gc(s) +
smaxX
sm
lm(s) gc(s) (3.11)
Then, the market clearing condition for labor becomes,
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La = L+ Lp = 1
I assume that the subsidies are nanced by a lump-sum tax T on consumers
which gives the government budget constraint as,
T =
Psmax
sl
(s) y(s)
where sl is productivity level of plant with minimum employment size l. Then
the economy resource constraint is given by C = Y , where C is aggregate consump-
tion. Aggregate industry output equals sum of outputs produced by plants with
dierent technologies.
Y = Yn + Ym =
smX
sn
yn(s) gc(s) +
smaxX
sm
ym(s) gc(s) (3.12)
To nd an expression for the industry TFP and TFP of plants with standard
and eciency technologies, I aggregated demands for capital and labor with subsidy
over technology i and calculated total capital and labor employed by each group of
producers.
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(3.14)
where si and si+1 are the lower and upper productivity thresholds of establish-
ments with technology i. gc(s) denotes the conditional productivity distribution on
operating with technology i. Combining (3.13) and (3.14) gives,
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Now, we can calculate the aggregate output of producers with technology i as,
Yi = (
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substituting (3.15) in (3.16) yields,
Yi = (TFPi)
1   Ki L1 i 
where, the aggregate TFP for producers with standard and ecient technologies
is given by,
TFPn = n
Psm
sn
s (1 + (s)n)

1  gc(s)
 1
1 Psm
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1
1 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(3.17)
TFPm = m
Psmax
sm
s (1 + (s)m)

1  gc(s)
 1
1 Psmax
sm
s (1 + (s)m)
1
1  gc(s)
 
1 
(3.18)
Note that, without subsidies, or, if the subsidies are given to all plants in the
industry, the aggregate TFP of standard and ecient producers become independent
of the subsidy rate and becomes the weighted average of the plant level productivity
indexes s.
TFP i = i
Psi+1
si
s gc(s)
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Now, to nd an expression for the aggregate industry TFP, I calculated the
aggregate capital (K = Kn +Km) and labor (L = Ln + Lm) for the whole industry
rst. It can be shown that,
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where Vi is dened as;
Vn = n
Psm
sn
s (1 + (s)n)
1
1  gc(s)
Vm = m
Psmax
sm
s (1 + (s)m)
1
1  gc(s)
Then, I dene the aggregate output of the industry as the sum of outputs pro-
duced under each technology (Yn + Ym),
Y = (
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where Wi is dened as;
Wn = n
Psm
sn
s (1 + (s)n)

1  gc(s)
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From (3.19) and (3.20), it is straightforward to derive an expression for the
aggregate industry output in the form of Cobb-Douglas production technology as,
Y = (TFP )1  (K L1 ) (3.21)
where the aggregate TFP is dened as,
TFP =

Wn+Wm
(Vn+Vm)

 1
1 
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substituting forWi and Vi, gives the aggregate industry TFP in terms of subsidy
rates and the conditional distribution of the plant level productivity indexes.
TFP =
0@ nPsmsn s(1 + (s)n) 1  gc(s) + mPsmaxsm s(1 + (s)m) 1  gc(s)
n
Psm
sn
s(1 + (s)n)
1
1  gc(s) + m
Psmax
sm
s(1 + (s)m)
1
1  gc(s)

1A 11 
(3.22)
In this equation, the aggregate industry TFP is the weighted average of the
plant-level productivity indexes of standard and ecient producers adjusted by the
subsidy rate. Equation (3.17), (3.19), and (3.22) are the key equations for the quan-
titative experiments in the next section. An important feature of equation (3.22) lies
on the link between subsidies and the industry TFP. Without subsidies, TFPi = Vi
and the industry TFP are simply the sum of TFPs of standard and ecient plants.
If subsidies are given uniformly to all plants in the industry ((s)n = (s)m), then
the aggregate TFP becomes independent of the subsidy rates and it is simplied to
(3.23). However, any idiosyncratic subsidy directly impacts the industry TFP and
leads to a larger change in the measures of productivity.
TFP((s)i=0) = n
smX
sn
s gc(s) + m
smaxX
sm
s gc(s) (3.23)
Equilibrium
The model exhibits an equilibrium with a wage rate w, a rental rate of capital
r, subsidy rates i, and distribution of productivity across plants g(s), such that:
1. individuals make optimal decisions on occupation choice,
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2. entrepreneurs optimally choose between standard and ecient technologies,
3. allocation of labor and capital across plants is ecient,
4. markets clear,
Calibration
I calibrated the benchmark economy to India's Iron and Steel industry with
no distortion (i(s) = 0) prior to the National Steel Policy in 2005. The period
was chosen to be one year and the population was normalized to one. I followed
the standard procedure to choose parameters of the production technology. The
span-of-control parameter  is set to 0.7 and  is set to 0.3. I split plants into
standard and ecient producers as follows: I calculated the share of each primary
input in total fuel expenditure. If a plant used coal as their primary input and if
the coal expenditure accounted for at least 90% of the total fuel expenditure in that
plant, I classied it as a standard plant. In contrast, If the plant used one of the
other primary fuel inputs (gas, electricity, hydrocarbon), I classied it as an ecient
producer. The productivity parameter of the standard and ecient technologies (n
and m) are chosen to match the relative labor productivity of standard and ecient
producers over 1999-04. Normalizing n to one, the productivity parameter of the
ecient technology is calculated as 1.40. This indicates that on average, the labor
productivity of the ecient technology is 40% higher than the standard technology.
In an economy with no distortions, there is a simple mapping between establishment-
level productivity and the size of employment (Bello et al., 2011). I estimated the
distribution of plant-level productivity to match the size distribution of employment
in India's Iron and Steel sector over 1999-04. The distribution is approximated by
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a log-normal distribution function. Since the demands for labor are linear in s, the
relative productivity parameter of every two plants remains proportional to their
employment sizes. I approximated the vector of plant-level productivity with a lin-
early spaced grid of 10000 points. Given that the average minimum and maximum
number of employees in the industry are 10 and 4,000 workers, I set the minimum
productivity level at smin=0.01 and pinned down the maximum level of productiv-
ity at smax = 4 using the following equation. Then, I approximated the mean and
variance of the log-normal distribution function that corresponds to the plant-level
productivity distribution. Figure 3.2 shows the plant-size distribution in data and
its approximation by model.
lmax
lmin
= smax
smin
0−100 100−250 250−400 400−600 600−800 800−1000 1000+
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Employement Size 
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 P
la
nt
s
 
 
Model
Data
Figure 3{2: Distribution of Plant-level Productivity by Log-normal
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To pin down the xed technology-specic costs cn and cm, I set two targets: (1)
the average share of managers and supervisory sta in total employees is 80%3 , and
(2) the share of ecient producers in total employment of the industry is 33%. These
targets are used to locate the lower and upper productivity thresholds in the model.
Now, using the mean and variance of the productivity distribution, the model can be
solved in equilibrium for technology-specic xed costs cn and cm, market wage rate
w, and interest rate r. Table 3.3 provides a summary of the parameters and targets.
Table 3{3: Model Calibration with Technology Choice
Parameter Value Targets
share of workers 0.80 from data
Employment share of e. plants 0.33 from data
Parameter of stnd. technology n= 1 normalization
Parameter of e. technology m= 1.40 relative TFP of stnd. and e. plants
span-of-control = 0.7 from literature
capital income share = 0.3 from literature
xed cost of stnd. technology cn=-0.0282 share of workers=80%
xed cost of e. technology cm= 0.1888 employment share of e. plants=33%
mean of distribution function = -1.62 to match employment distribution
variance of distribution function =1.28 to match employment distribution
To perform the quantitative experiments, the technology-specic costs and the
mean and variance of the productivity distribution remain constant. To calibrate the
subsidy policy, I constructed a subsidy vector. I computed the minimum employment
size of plants with multiple production units over 1999-04. This gives the cut-o
employment size of the subsidized producers at roughly l=250. Any plant with
3 This indicates that on average 80% of employees in each plant in data are man-
agers and supervisors
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minimum 250 employees receives subsidies to production. To construct the vector of
plant-level subsidy, I calculated the plant-level productivity index that corresponds
to 250 employees at 0.626 and dene the subsidy vector as follows:
i(s) =  if s  0:626
i(s) = 0 otherwise
I choose the size of subsidies as follows: The minimum and maximum disburse-
ment of the government funds as a percentage of annual sales in Indian Iron and
Steel sector between 2005 and 2008 were 0.12% and 0.16%.4 Given that the subsi-
dized plants produce around 70% of the aggregate output in the industry, the rates
of subsidies are calculated between 0.17% (0.12/0.7) and 0.22% (0.16/0.7).5
3.5 Policy Impact
The calibrated model performs well in reproducing changes in TFP growth rates
and the productivity gap between producers with dierent technologies. Table 3.4
reports the outcomes of subsidies to producers with a minimum 250 employees. The
4 Indian Ministry of Steel, Annual Report 2011-12.
5 In India's Iron and Steel industry, subsidies are reported as a share in R&D
investment and R&D investment is reported as a percentage of annual sales turnover.
Annual turnover is the gross amount of sales received by plants. In contrast, the value
of output represents the total value of turnover in an accounting period plus the value
of other incomes including income from industrial, non-industrial services, variation
in the stock of semi-nished goods, value of electricity generated and sold, value
of own construction, net balance of goods sold in the same condition as purchased,
and sale value of goods sold in the same condition as purchased. In my sample, the
value of turnover and the value of output are roughly the same, so, to conduct the
experiments, I consider subsidies as percentage of output.
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policy increases the aggregate industry TFP and the the gap in TFP growth rates
between plants with dierent technologies. The predicted changes in TFP growth
rates and gap are consistent with the those directly observed from data. A subsidy
of 0.17% - 0.22% to output increases the aggregate industry TFP growth by 0.57-%-
0.75% which contributes to 16% to 21% of the industry TFP growth reported by the
data (around 1/5 of the observed aggregate TFP growth). The model also predicts
that the policy would lead to a 1.50%-1.91% gap in TFP growth between standard
and ecient producers which account to 44% to 56% of the actual productivity gap
in the industry calculated from data.
Table 3{4: Average Annual TFP Growth Rates and Gap; (%)
Industry TFP growth gap between standard and ecient plants
min = 0:17% 0.57 1.50
max = 0:22% 0.75 1.91
Output Change
Table 3.5 reports the impact of the size-dependent subsidies on aggregate in-
dustry output and output of plants with standard and ecient technologies. The
idiosyncratic policy leads to 0.23%-0.29% increase in the aggregate industry output
per year. The policy also increase output of ecient producers by 1.72%-2.20% and
reduce output of standard producers by 2.037%-3.05% (average per year).
Table 3{5: Average Annual Output Growth Rates; (%)
Subsidy Rate Industry Standard Producers Ecient Producers
m = 0:17% 0.23 -2.37 1.72
m = 0:22% 0.29 -3.05 2.20
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I identify three direct eects through which the size-dependent subsidies impact
the aggregate TFP growth and the gap in growth rate of plants with standard and
ecient technologies. (1) misallocation eect: the subsidy introduces idiosyncrasy in
the prices faced by individual producers, causing a reallocation of resources from non-
subsidized to subsidized plants, (2) technology upgrade eect: the plants that receive
the subsidies switch from the standard to the ecient technology, (3) selection eect:
through general equilibrium eects, who becomes worker and entrepreneur and what
technology each entrepreneur decides to use also impacts the aggregate industry
TFP.
Misallocation Eect
In the standard literature, the misallocation eect is expected to reduce aggre-
gate TFP. To measure the quantitative signicance of misallocation in my framework,
I shutdown the endogenous technology choice. I re-calibrate the model to a new envi-
ronment in which only one technology was available for production. The only decision
for individuals is to choose between being a hired worker or an entrepreneur. For
simplicity, the technology specic parameter  is normalized to one. In the above
environment, there is only one threshold of skills that determines allocation of indi-
viduals between workers and entrepreneurs. The rest of the calibrated parameters
and the approximation of the productivity distribution remain unchanged. Table 3.6
shows parameter of the model in the environment with one production technology.
The policy is still to subsidize plants with a minimum of 250 employees. There-
fore, the subsidy vector remains the same too. Since, the subsidies are given to
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Table 3{6: Model Calibration Without Technology Choice
Parameter Value Targets
share of workers 0.80 from data
technology-specic parameter = 1 normalization
span-of-control = 0.7 from literature
capital income share = 0.3 from literature
xed cost of stnd. technology c= 0.0243 share of workers=80%
mean of distribution function = -1.62 to match employment distribution
variance of distribution function =1.28 to match employment distribution
the large plants, the prot of plants with a productivity index closed to the thresh-
old of skills remains unchanged. The following equation is used to calculate the
aggregate TFP. To control for the general equilibrium eect, I hold the total num-
ber of entrepreneurs xed. The policy leads to a reallocation of resources from
non-subsidized plants to subsidized plants (larger units) causing misallocation. The
impact of 0.17%-0.22% subsidies to output on aggregate TFP is reported in Table
3.7. The misallocation eect should cause a 2% decline in the observed aggregate
TFP growth in the industry.
TFP =
0@ Psmaxsmin s(1+(s)n) 1  gc(s)Psmax
smin
s(1+(s)n)
1
1  gc(s)

1A 11 
The proportional increase in the output of subsidized plants is less than the
proportion increased in the inputs employed by those plants. The policy leads to a
small decrease in the aggregate TFP as the subsidies are given to more productive
producers in the industry (there is a negative correlation between the misallocation
eect and productivity levels of plants that are hit by distortions).
76
Table 3{7: Misallocation Eect; (%)
Industry TFP
m = 0:17% -0.01
m = 0:22% -0.04
Technology Upgrade Eect
A part of the productivity growth is attributed to the technology upgrading at
plant level. The technology selection is determined by the level of plant productivity
as well as the technology-specic costs. The subsidies incentivize plants to adopt
the ecient technology that is more productive. To measure the technology upgrade
eect, I held the total number of plants unchanged and calculated the productivity
gain generated from the technology switch only. The model predicts that the tech-
nology upgrading eect contributes to 49% of the aggregate TFP growth calculated
from data.
There is strong supporting evidence of technological change in India's Iron and
Steel industry over the last decade. Iron and steel making processes are extremely
intensive in the use of material and energy. The Iron and Steel producers were
faced with a wide range of technologies that were fundamentally characterized by
energy usage. For example, an Open Hearth Furnace (OHF) is an inecient tech-
nology introduced in 1850's in India. Most OHFs have been closed due to their
fuel ineciency and are being replaced by other technologies such as the Basic Oxy-
gen Furnace (BOF). According to India's Iron and Steel industry Annual Report,
technology replacement reduced the average share of the OHF in the total steel pro-
duction in India from 16.6% over 1999-2004 to less than 2% in 2005-08 (Table 3.8).
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In addition, in recent years, a number of smaller units equipped with the Electric
Arc Furnace (ERF) have invested in capacity expansion projects and increased their
level of production.6
Table 3{8: Share of Technologies in Crude Steel Production, %
1999-2004 2005-2008
Ecient technology (BOF) 50.8 41.4
Ecient technology (EAF) 32.6 56.6
Standard technology (OHF) 16.6 2.0
The evidence of technological change can also be observed from fuel expenditures
in the industry. The technological change would be expected to reduce consumption
of coal as an inecient input in the industry. Table 3.9 reports the share of coal,
electricity, and other fuels as the main primary inputs in total fuel expenditures from
1999-04 to 2005-08 using the ASI data. The share of coal in total fuels expenditures
decreased from 24.3% to 21% while share of other fuels increased from 14% to 17%
during the same period.
Table 3{9: Share of Primary Fuel Inputs in Total Fuel Expenditures, %
1999-2004 2005-2008
Ecient Fuels (gas, electricity, hydrocarbon) 75.7 79.0
Inecient Fuel (coal) 24.3 21.0
6 Source: Statistics Archive, World Steel Association.
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Selection Eect
The choice of occupation for individuals and choice of technology for entrepreneurs
were directly inuenced by the industry wage rate and the expected prot of en-
trepreneurship with a given technology. A higher wage rate makes the labor market
more attractive than entrepreneurship. On the other hand, the expected prots in
the industry depend directly on establishment-level productivity and the size of sub-
sidies. Since the subsidies were given only to large producers, the expected prot
earned by small plants remained unchanged while the wage rate went up. The en-
trepreneurs with the lowest managerial ability changed their occupation and become
hired workers. This increased the average plant size and market share of the sur-
viving plants. In addition, the subsidies changed the upper threshold level of skills
and increased the size of ecient plants throughout the industry. The overall general
equilibrium eect is such that the aggregate industry TFP increased. The model pre-
dicts that the selection eect would contribute to 53% of the aggregate TFP growth
in the industry.
Table 3.10 reports changes to the average plant size in India's Iron and Steel
industry as observed from the ASI data and predicted by the model before and after
the policy change in 2005. The subsidy policy explains about 15% of the increase in
the average number of workers per plant in the whole industry, and 40% and 27%
of the decrease/increase in the average number of workers in standard and ecient
plants respectively.
Overall, the share of each channel in the aggregate TFP growth is summarized
in Table 3.11.
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Table 3{10: Change in Average Number of Workers in Each Plant; Model vs. Data
Data Model
Total Industry 11% 1.7%
Standard Producers -8% -3.4%
Ecient Producers 17% 4.6%
Table 3{11: Sources of TFP Growth (%)
Model
Misallocation Eect -2.0
Technology Upgrade Eect 49.0
Selection Eect 53.0
3.6 Conclusion
In overall, the results of this chapter show that an endogenous improvement in
the establishment-level productivity induced by size-dependent subsidies can domi-
nate the misallocation eect and lead to an increase in aggregate TFP.
In this chapter, I examined the impact of distortions generated by size-dependent
subsidies that lead to misallocation but encouraged technology adoption at establishment-
level. I focused on subsidies that were given under the National Steel Policy initiated
in 2005 in India's Iron and Steel sector. The policy was size-dependent in practice
and only large Iron and Steel plants received the subsidies. My growth accounting
in chapter two shows that India's Iron and Steel industry experienced a high TFP
growth during 1999-08 and especially after the policy change in 2005. The average
growth rate of TFP increased from 1.72% over 1999-04 to 3.61% over 2005-08. The
main source of the TFP growth was within-plant eciency rather than realloca-
tion. I identied technology change as a possible source of the within-plant eciency
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growth. The technology-wise growth accounting showed that only plants with e-
cient technology grew faster after the policy change and that the TFP of standard
producers actually declined over 2005-08.
I extended the Lucas (1978) span-of-control model to include a technology choice
at the establishment-level along the lines of Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014b) and
calibrated it to the plant-level data prior to the policy change in 2005. Without the
technology change, the model produces misallocation eect through a small TFP
loss. However, when the technology upgrade is allowed, the model predicts that
subsidies to plants with minimum 250 employees can increase industry TFP growth
by 0.63%-0.71% which explains about 16%-21% of the observed TFP growth from
data (calculated in chapter two). While, the misallocation eect had a negative
impact on the aggregate TFP growth, the technological upgrade eect is dominant
and increases TFP growth in the industry.
The ndings of this chapter contribute to a deeper understanding of policy
distortions that generate misallocation eect but impact establishment-level produc-
tivity at the same time. My ndings are similar to the existing empirical works
on misallocation if the technology upgrade channel is shutdown. However, because
distortions induce a technology upgrade at establishment-level, then an increased
establishment-level productivity can enhance TFP at the aggregate level.
My empirical analysis in this chapter did not take into account the other sources
of TFP growth in the industry. The Indian manufacturing sector has experienced
major liberalization policies in the last two decades that could potentially have im-
pacted measures of productivity too.
81
CHAPTER 4
The Impact of Labor Market Regulations on Plant-Level Productivity
4.1 Introduction
The Indian industry has witnessed a remarkable transformation to a market
based economy over the past two decades. Over this period, there has been a major
shift in economic policies towards opening markets to foreign trade, international
and private investments and reduction in government inuences over the economic
decisions. Along with the output market, labor market outcomes have also improved
in India during the economic reforms. However, in the labor markets the observed
gains have arisen primarily in the unorganized and informal sectors,1 where pro-
ductivity and wages are generally much lower than in the formal organized sector
(OECD, 2007). One of the main reasons why formal labor markets in India did not
benet from the reforms is that the labor markets are inexible and are subject to
many regulations.
1 In India, the rst ocial denition of the unorganized sector was given by Central
Statistical Organization (CSO). According to CSO (1980), the unorganized sector
refers to those operating units whose activity is not regulated under any statutory
Act or legal provision and/or which do not maintain any regular accounts.
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According to the OECD indicator of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)2 ,
India has one of the highest employment protection legislation indexes among OECD
countries and the labor market in India is among the most stringent in the world.
Despite the remarkable output growth in the last four decades, the labor market reg-
ulations in India have been blamed for the poor productivity performance especially
for the large-scale labor-intensive manufacturing sector (Dougherty et al., 2011). The
lack of job creation particularly in larger rms operating in the organized sector is
also attributed to the restrictive legislation governing regular employment in large
rms. Rigid labor legislation makes it extremely dicult for large rms to make
necessary adjustments in labor demands and even making a change in job descrip-
tions can be problematic for large rms. Consequently, rms in India are moving
toward less labor-intensive activities or use of more capital-intensive technologies in
the production process.
The India's employment protection legislation index (EPL) captures the strin-
gency of labor regulations, for both regular employment and temporary or xed-term
employment. For regular employment, India's labor laws are stricter than all OECD
countries except Portugal and Indonesia (Figure 4.1). This stringency in the regular
2 The OECD indicators of Employment Protection Legislation measure the proce-
dures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the proce-
dures involved in hiring workers on xed-term or temporary work agency contracts.
It is important to note that employment protection refers to only one dimension of
the complex set of factors that inuence labor market exibility.
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employment status is mainly attributed to the existing diculties of obtaining gov-
ernment permission to lay-o workers for plants with more than 100 workers (based
on the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA)).3
Figure 4{1: Strictness of EPL: Regular Employment (Source: OECD)
The position of India's EPL regime is more relaxed only for temporary and
xed-term contracts. The EPL score for the temporary employment status in India
is around the mean score among the OECD countries (Figure 4.2). The moderate
3 Firms are required to give workers written notice of dismissal. For retrenchments,
the relevant government authority must also be notied (art. 25F, Industrial disputes
act, 1947). For establishments with 100 or more workers, the employer must also
obtain permission from the relevant government authority before retrenchment can
take place. Retrenchment is dened as termination for whatsoever reason, except in
the case of disciplinary action (see e.g. State Bank of India v. N Sundara Money
[1976] 3 SCR 160).
84
score of India for temporary contracts implies that India has experienced partial
labor reforms in recent years, which allow employers to hire workers on temporary
contracts basis using job contract agencies. Standard xed-term contracts are also
allowed for white-collar workers in India.
Figure 4{2: Strictness of EPL: Temporary Employment (source: OECD)
Despite the stringency in the labor regulations in India, the implementation of
the labor market regulations varies across the states which allows rms to alter their
behavior to reduce the impact of the regulations. India's constitution gives direct
responsibility for a number of areas of economic policy to the state governments as
well as shared responsibility with central government in a number of other areas.
The state governments have also been given the right on how to implement the laws
in certain areas, or amend central legislation prior to the implementation. Moreover,
the state governments usually formulate and administer the rules and procedures
through which all laws are enforced. As a result, diering economic views across
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state governments on the role of the public sector have led to a considerable variation
in the business environment across states in India including labor markets.
For a better understanding of how state-level reforms and amendments to the
laws may have inuenced the labor market outcomes in India, the OECD developed
a customized survey instrument to identify the areas in which Indian states have
made specic changes to the implementation and administration of labor laws and
regulations.
Figure 4{3: Index of State-level Labor Reforms in India (source: OECD)
Figure 4.3 represents the normalized proportion of the labor market reforms
undertaken by the states in India. The index provides a quantitative measure of
the extent to which states have made changes in their implementation of labor laws
and regulations. The index was constructed based on eight major labor legal areas,
identifying 50 specic subjects of possible reforms. For example, an index of over 0.5
for Uttar Pradesh indicates that this state has made over 50% formal amendments on
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implementation of the eight major labor laws to improve its labor market outcomes.
As the gure shows, there is a large variation in the extent of reforms across the
states. The state of Chhattisgarh, Goa and Bihar are ranked among the lowest in
terms of the proportion of reforms while Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh
with over 50% amendments are ranked among the highest in terms of labor market
reforms.
In this study, I propose to investigate the impact of labor market regulations on
plant-level productivity in manufacturing sector in India. I use plant-level data for
the whole manufacturing sector from the India Annual Survey of Industries (ASI)
and construct a balanced panel of establishments over 1999-2008. I calculate TFP at
the plant-level rst. Then, I use the state-level labor reform index (Dougherty2008)
that captures cross-state variation in labor market reforms and examine how the
state-level reforms may have aected plant-level productivity in the manufacturing
sector. A positive association between plant-level productivity and the measure of
labor market reform will indicate that amendments to the labor laws reduce the
scope of regulations and increases plant-level productivity.
The results of this chapter imply that the state-level labor reforms in India
have a positive impact on TFP and labor productivity. The impact of labor market
reforms on productivity is larger in industries where plants rely more on labor than
in industries in which labor is relatively less important.
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4.2 Literature Review
A broad literature exists on the economic impacts of labor market regulations.
A primary question in this literature is how an increase in the layo costs (or r-
ing/dismissal costs) impacts employment level or other measures of performance.
The labor market theory suggests that ring costs may have an ambiguous impact
on employment levels. Regulations that increase cost of labor adjustment operate
as a tax on ring and increase the cost of layos. While, the employment protec-
tion seems to enhance employment by preventing labor dismissals, it may also aect
incentive of rms to hire new workers which in turn reduces employment in the long-
term. Given that the protection legislation generates distortions at the rm-level,
some producers may nd it optimal not to hire workers whose short-term marginal
product exceeds their market wage and stay with unproductive workers (Blanchard
and Portugal, 2001). The distorted input choice reduces worker ows and rms
are more likely to substitute capital for labor and move to more capital-intensive
activities.
The impact of labor market regulations on measures of productivity has also
attracted considerable attention in the literature. The net eect of labor market reg-
ulations on productivity is ambiguous too. A study by Crafts (2006) provides strong
evidence consistent with the endogenous growth models that regulations which in-
hibit entry to product markets, have an adverse eect on TFP growth in OECD
countries. Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) also provide evidence that strict employ-
ment protection legislation can raise the cost of hiring and impact the labor adjust-
ment process. Regulations make the labor adjustment more dicult and can reduce
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rm's incentives to innovation, which further slow-downs productivity growth at the
rm-level. Auer et. al (2005) assessed the impact of employment tenure on rms'
productivity in 13 European countries between 1992 and 2002. The study shows that
both extensive tenure and short-tenure have possible adverse aects on productivity.
On the other hand, there are empirical studies showing that labor market regula-
tions may actually enhance productivity growth. For example, Storm and Naastepad
(2007) examined the impact of labor market regulations on labor productivity growth
of 20 OECD countries between 1984 and 1997 and showed that relatively rigid labor
markets can promote long-run labor productivity.
Most of the empirical studies on the impacts of labor market regulations in
India have used the OECD's indicator of Product Market Regulation (PMR), the
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) Index, and the BB Index constructed by
Besley and Burgess (2004). The last two indexes were calculated at the state-level
based on the amendments made to the labor market regulations. The amendments to
the acts and regulations are normally made by the state's legal authorities in order to
reduce transaction costs through limiting the scope of the regulations. In calculating
the labor market indexes, particular attention is often given to amendments made
to the Chapter V-B in the IDA-1947, which required rms employing 100 or more
workers to obtain government permission for layos, retrenchments and closures. The
Chapter V-B in the IDA-1947 is important because the permission to lay-o workers
is normally dicult to obtain and employers might be reluctant to hire workers
because later they cannot lay-o workers without permission. The legislation could
also harm economic performance since it provides protection for workers only in
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the organized sector and prevent the expansion of industrial employment that could
benet the mass of workers outside. In addition, the restriction could discourage rms
from expanding their production scale, thereby reducing the level of manufacturing
productivity.
A study by Besley and Burgess (2004) focused on the eect of the Industrial
Disputes Act 1947 on the pattern of manufacturing growth over the period of 1958-
1992. They reviewed the state amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947
and classied the amendments to pro-worker (if workers beneted from the amend-
ment to the act), pro-employer (if employer beneted from the amendment to the
act), and neutral (if the amendment had no impact on either group). This index
is known as the BB index. Besley and Burgess (2004) show that the pro-worker
labor legislation is associated with an increase in urban poverty. Pro-worker labor
regulation also results in lower output, employment, investment and productivity in
the formal manufacturing sector while the output in informal manufacturing sector
will increase.
In another study, Bassanini and Venn (2008) investigated the impact of labor
market policies on labor productivity and multi-factor productivity with industry-
level data across OECD countries. Their study shows that the employment protec-
tion legislation, minimum wage, parental leave and unemployment benets inuence
productivity through multiple channels, over and above their impact on employment
levels. They found that stringent EPL has a small negative impact on long-run pro-
ductivity growth, most likely by restricting the movement of labor into emerging,
high-productivity activities. Dougherty et al. (2011) also used plant-level data to
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assess the impact of labor reforms on total factor productivity (TFP) and labor pro-
ductivity in India. Their ndings indicate that labor reforms have a positive impact
on establishment-level productivity and rms in the labor-intensive industries bene-
ted the most from labor reforms.4 Conway and Herd (2009) assess the extent to
which India's regulatory environment promotes or inhibits competition in markets
where technology and market conditions make competition viable. Their study using
the OECD's indicators of Product Market Regulation (PMR)5 considers a number
of channels through which the regulatory environment can inuence productivity at
the state-level and found that states with relatively liberal regulatory settings could
attract more foreign direct investment, have better infrastructure, and a larger share
of employment in the organized sector relative to more restrictive states.
Despite the wide use of the labor reform index and the BB index, they have
been criticized by Bhattacharjea (2006 and 2009) in terms of research methodology.
Bhattacharjea states that in calculating the labor reform index and BB index too
4 My study diers from Dougherty et al. (2011) in terms of data and analysis. I
constructed a balanced panel of continues rms over 1999-2008 without accounting
for entry and exit. The variables used in my regression model also dier in terms of
control variables and measurements. In addition, I used the LP approach to estimate
TFP at the plant-level. The LP approach uses material as the proxy variable as
oppose to investment as the proxy for the unobservable shocks in the OP approach.
As it was shown by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), using investment as a proxy may
not smoothly respond to the productivity shock since many plants in the ASI survey
report zero investment.
5 PMR index also has been used extensively over the last decade to benchmark
regulatory frameworks in OECD countries
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much attention has been given to the Chapter V-B in the IDA-1947 while other
areas of improvement in the India labor market performance were ignored. His
study showed that there is no conclusive evidence of a link between the labor market
reforms and rms' performance in India.
4.3 Data
In this chapter, I use the ASI data in the entire manufacturing sector over 1999-
2008. The ASI is the principal source of industrial statistics in India, which provides
information on performance, composition and structure of organized manufacturing
sector. The ASI was initially launched in 1960 with 1959 as the reference year and
is continuing since then except for 1972. The ASI extends to the whole of India
and covers all factories registered under Sections 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the Factories
Act, 1948 i.e. those factories employing 10 or more workers using power; and those
employing 20 or more workers without using power.
The ASI frame is based on the lists of registered factory/units maintained by
the Chief Inspector of Factories (CIF) in each state in India. All the factories in the
ASI frame are classied under the National Industrial Classication (NIC) in their
appropriate industry groups based on the principal product manufactured. The data
used in this study are based on the NIC-1998 covering ASI 1998-99 to ASI 2003-04.
Then, for ASI 2004-05 to ASI 2007-08, I use the revised NIC introduced in 2004.
Since, the OECD survey of labor market regulations in India and the state-
level labor reform index covered only 21 states in India (Appendix E provides more
information about the OECD Indicators of Employment Protection Index), I also
use plant-level data on the same 21 states for the analysis. This gives an unbalanced
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panel of 1,306,106 plants over 1999-2008. Table 4.1 shows the number of plants per
year in the unbalanced panel varies from 123,957 in 2003 to 141,599 in 2008.
Table 4{1: Number of plants per year in unbalanced panel
year Number of plants
1999 128439
2000 127952
2001 127438
2002 124524
2003 123957
2004 125011
2005 131760
2006 135497
2007 139929
2008 141599
Total 1306106
The size of organized sector as well as the number of registered establishments
varies across states. Table 4.2 shows the average number of registered plants in each
state in India reported by the ASI. The average number of plants in each state in
the panel is 130,000. Goa has the lowest number of registered establishments with
512 plants over 1999-2008 while Tamil Nadu has the highest number of registered
establishments with an average of 20704 over 1999-2008.
Table 4.3 shows the capital-labor ratio, labor productivity and average plant
size in each state over 1999-08. The capital-labor ratio is calculated as the ratio of
xed assets to total number of workers over 1999-08. Labor productivity is measured
as the ratio of value of gross output to total number of workers over 1999-08. Plants
size is calculated as ratio of total workers to total number of plants over 1999-08.
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Table 4{2: Number of plants per state (averaged over 1999-08)
State Number of plants
Himachal Pradesh 645
Punjub 7748
Uttaranchal 844
Haryana 4343
Delhi 3370
Rajasthan 5523
Uttar Pradesh 9931
Bihar 1570
Assam 1643
West Bengal 6066
Jharkhand 1508
Orissa 1720
Chattisgarh 1419
Madhya Pradesh 3092
Gujarat 14127
Maharashtra 18436
Andhra Pradesh 14831
Karnataka 7412
Goa 512
Kerala 5167
Tamil Nadu 20704
Total 130611
As the table shows, on average, plants in Jharkhand have the largest size with 109.4
workers per plant compared to the other states in India.
The capital-labor ratio also shows a large variation across the states. While
Himachal Pradesh, Orissa, and Gujarat have higher capital-labor ratios, Kerala,
Delhi, and Andhra Pradesh are mostly labor-intensive states and have lower capital-
labor ratios (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.5 provides the index of labor productivity for the Indian states over
1999-2008. As the gure shows there are large variations in the labor productivity
94
Table 4{3: State-level performance in 1999-2008 (unbalanced panel)
State Capital-Labor Ratio Labor Productivity Plant Size
Himachal Pradesh 0.057 0.103 74.4
Punjub 0.014 0.062 50.6
Uttaranchal 0.026 0.076 67.5
Haryana 0.023 0.088 82.2
Delhi 0.009 0.072 37.1
Rajasthan 0.030 0.076 48.0
Uttar Pradesh 0.031 0.077 60.7
Bihar 0.018 0.079 40.6
Assam 0.022 0.063 73.0
West Bengal 0.020 0.053 90.8
Jharkhand 0.050 0.094 109.4
Orissa 0.056 0.070 81.3
Chattisgarh 0.049 0.097 77.0
Madhya Pradesh 0.034 0.095 76.8
Gujarat 0.054 0.125 58.5
Maharashtra 0.033 0.108 67.2
Andhra Pradesh 0.018 0.047 63.6
Karnataka 0.032 0.073 75.7
Goa 0.047 0.155 68.8
Kerala 0.011 0.051 61.0
Tamil Nadu 0.018 0.053 61.5
index across states over 1999-08. The states of Goa, Gujarat, and Maharashtra had
the highest labor productivity index while Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu
had the lowest labor productivity index over the period 1999-08.
Because there is no plant identier in the ASI data before 2004-05, I can not
use the unbalanced panel directly for data analysis which needs observations at the
plant-level and over time. Therefore, I applied a matching procedure to construct a
balanced panel over 1999-2008. As explained in chapter two, to link-up the observa-
tions over years, I use the information on several identication which are reported on
95
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010
2000 2005 2010
Himachal Pradesh Punjub Uttaranchal Haryana Delhi
Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Bihar Assam West Bengal
Jharkhand Orissa Chattisgarh Madhya Pradesh Gujarat
Maharashtra Andhra Pradesh Karnataka Goa Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Ca
pi
ta
l−
La
bo
ur
 R
at
io
 (F
ixe
d A
ss
ets
 / N
um
be
r o
f E
mp
loy
ee
s)
Year (1999−2008)
Figure 4{4: Capital-Labor Ratio by State, (Unbalanced Panel)
a consistent basis. These variables are reported every year and include \year of ini-
tial production", \state code", \district code", \sector code", \type of organization",
and \type of ownership". I match plants in every two consecutive years based on
each identication variable separately rst and I keep only plants that match for at
least three identication variables. To minimize the errors, I check the closing value
of xed assets with the opening value of xed assets next year. The balanced panel
must then include plants that are matched based on at least 3 identication vari-
ables and plants must also have the same or very similar closing values and opening
values of xed assets next year. To reduce the inuence of outliers in the analysis,
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Figure 4{5: State-level labor productivity, (Unbalanced Panel)
following Bollard et al. (2010), I winsorize the data. To winsorize the data, I replace
data in the top 1% tail and bottom 1% tail of all variables with their value of the
99th and 1st percentiles. All the values are deated by price indexes provided by
the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy published by the \Reserve Bank of
India".
The constructed balanced panel includes around 1750 plants per year or in total
17,500 observations. Because the balanced panel only includes plants that have been
in operation during 1999-2008 and entry of new plants or exit are not reported,
its size reduces dramatically compared to the unbalanced panel. In addition, the
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matching procedure has resulted in drop of many plants for either lack of identiers
or missing information.
The index of state-level labor reform comes from the OECD (2007) which sum-
marizes state-level indicators of procedural changes to the implementation of labor
laws. The indicators measure the strictness of federal EPL settings in India, and
provide a quantitative indication of the extent to which states have or have not
made changes in their implementation of labor laws and regulations. To construct
the index, the OECD used a customized survey instrument to identify the areas in
which Indian states have made specic discrete changes to the implementation and
administration of labor laws. This state-level survey covered eight major labor legal
areas, identifying 50 specic subjects of possible reforms, many of which could be
implemented by administrative procedures rather than through formal amendments
to the laws. The survey only 21 states in which the amendments to the law have been
systematically documented. The reforms covered in the index concern eight specic
areas of \The Industrial Disputes Act (IDA)", \Factories Act", \State Shops and
Commercial Establishments Acts", \Contract Labor Act", \the Role of Inspectors",
\the Maintenance of Registers", \the Filing of Returns" and \Union Representation."
A list of the subjects and summary scores are provided in Appendix F.
To incorporate the state-level labor reform index in the data analysis, I follow the
approach of Dougherty et al. (2011) and classify Indian states into having exible and
inexible labor markets based on their state-level labor reform scores. In particular,
a state has a exible labor market if it has labor reform score above the median
and inexible otherwise. This classication exhibits the degree of labor regulation
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reforms in each state in India. I will use this indicator later as a dummy variable in
the regression analysis.
Figure 4.6 shows the mean score of labor reforms across the Indian states re-
ported in 2007. The gure illustrates that the largest number of reforms that were
identied concern the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) and the Contract Labor Act.
In contrast, the smallest amount of reforms has been on the Role of Inspectors and
Registers which indicate the rules concerning the role of unions in the Indian labor
markets.
Figure 4{6: Areas of state-level labor law reform
The index of labor market reform is consistent with the state-wise unemployment
data in India. Table 4.4 shows the unemployment rate for Rural and Urban areas in
the Indian states with exible and inexible labor markets collected from Ministry of
Labour & Employment of India. As the table illustrates, the states that introduced
more amendments to the labor regulations (states with exible labor markets) have
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relatively lower unemployment rates than the states with inexible labor markets.
For example, the average unemployment rate in the states with exible labor market
is 5.0% while the average unemployment rate in the states with inexible labor
market is 9.6% per year.
Table 4{4: Unemployment Rate in States with Flexible and Inexible Labor Markets
States Rural Urban Rural+Urban
Andhra Pradesh 5.4 7.9 5.9
Delhi 6.9 6.3 6.4
Gujarat 1.6 1.6 1.6
Haryana 6.7 5.3 6.3
Himachal Pradesh 4.7 5.7 4.8
Karnataka 4.4 3.5 4.2
Madhya Pradesh 3.9 6.3 4.4
Maharashtra 4.2 5.3 4.6
Orissa 6.6 5.4 6.5
Punjab 4.3 4.4 4.3
Rajasthan 3.8 3.8 3.8
Tamil Nadu 6.6 5.8 6.3
Uttar Pradesh 5.6 4.4 5.4
Average Flexible States 5.0 5.1 5.0
Assam 7.4 9.7 7.7
Bihar 11.2 5.8 10.8
Chhattisgarh 5.4 5.6 5.4
Goa 16.1 7.0 12.1
Jharkhand 9.6 8.2 9.4
Kerala 13.2 17.2 14.3
Uttarakhand 7.6 5.8 7.2
West Bengal 8.8 13.8 9.9
Average Inexible States 9.9 9.1 9.6
India 6.3 6.3 6.3
Figure 4.7 and 4.8 plot the density distribution of plant-level productivity and
plant-level capital-labor ratio for states with exible and inexible labor markets.
Labor productivity was measured as the ratio of value of output to total man-days
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worked in each plant. The capital-labor ratio was measured as the value of xed
assets divided by total man-days worked. Figure 4.7 suggests that labor productivity
in the states with exible labor markets is relatively higher than in states with more
stringent labor market regulations. In addition, states with exible labor markets are
relatively more capital-intensive than the states with inexible labor markets. As the
gure shows, states with lower labor intensity (larger capital intensity) experience a
greater improvement in their labor productivity distribution from the relaxation of
labor laws' enforcement when compared to more labor-intensive states. Figures 4.7
and 4.8 exhibit a modest positive relationship between labor productivity/capital-
labor ratio and labor market reforms in the Indian states.
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Figure 4{7: Labor productivity
Plant-level TFP
To examine the impact of labor market regulations on measures of productivity,
in this section I will estimate TFP at the plant-level. To estimate TFP, I use the
balanced panel of establishments in the 21 states over 1999-2008. I use the TFP
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Figure 4{8: Capital-labor ratio
estimation methodology (LP) developed by Petrin et al. (2004). The main advantage
of the LP estimator is that it accounts for the correlation between unobservable
productivity shocks and input levels in micro-level data sets. For example, a positive
productivity shock may encourage plants to expand output which in turn increases
demand for the inputs too. This correlation between the demand for inputs and
productivity shocks makes the OLS estimator biased and by implication, it leads
to biased estimates of plant-level productivity. The LP estimator use intermediate
input as proxies to solve the possible endogeneity in estimations6 .
Following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), I consider a CobbDouglas production
technology given by,
6 Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) also developed an estimator that uses investment,
as a proxy for these unobservable shocks. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) showed that
using investment as a proxy may not smoothly respond to the productivity shock
and is only valid for plants reporting nonzero investment.
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yt = 0 + l lt + k kt + mmt + !t + t (4.1)
where yt represents logarithm of output. lt denotes logarithm of labor, kt de-
notes logarithm of capital, and mt denotes logarithm of materials. ! indexes the
productivity component and  denotes the error term. Here the labor and material
inputs are considered as the freely variable inputs and capital is the state variable.
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) show that the error term  is uncorrelated with input
choices. The productivity component ! is a state variable which inuences the de-
cision rules of individual plants. Since ! is not observable, it can aect the choices
of inputs, leading to an endogeneity problem in the estimation of the production
function.
To account for the possible endogeneity, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) assumed
that the demand for the intermediate inputs depends on capital k and productivity
shock ! where the demand function is monotonically increasing in !t. The LP
approach also uses the fact that the previous period's level of material usage mt is
uncorrelated with this period's error term.
mt = mt(kt; !t) (4.2)
These assumptions allow the unobservable productivity term to be expressed as
a function of the two observed inputs of capital and materials.
!t = !t(kt;mt) (4.3)
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The last assumption in the LP estimation is that the productivity parameter !
follows a rst-order Markov process given by,
!t = E[!tj!t 1] + t (4.4)
where t is considered a possible source of the endogeneity and is dened as an
innovation to productivity that is uncorrelated with kt, but not necessarily with lt.
Now dene t as,
t(kt;mt) = 0 + k kt + mmt + !t(kt +mt) (4.5)
subsisting (4.5) back into the production function gives,
yt = l lt + t(kt;mt) + t (4.6)
In equation (4.6), l can be estimated using OLS with a third-order polynomial
approximation in kt and mt in place of t(kt;mt) and then with the given assump-
tions, the production function (4.1) and plant-level productivity can be estimated
using micro-level data.
In my estimation of the plant-level TFP, output is measured as the value of
gross output, labor is measured as total man-days worked, capital is measured as the
value of xed assets, and materials are measured as the total value of materials and
fuels. All the variables are measured in constant prices.
Figure 4.9 plots the distribution of plant-level TFP in the states with exible and
inexible labor markets. The plant-level TFP estimates are obtained from the LP
104
estimator explained above which yields unbiased estimates of the production function
coecients. The gure shows that plants in states with less restrictive labor market
regulations gain a larger improvement in their TFP distribution than plants in states
with inexible labor markets.
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Figure 4{9: Plant-Level TFP Density
4.4 Regression Analysis
The main purpose of this study is to explore the link between labor market
regulations (or labor market reforms) and measures of productivity. I exploit the
employment protection legislation data, which reect the state-level variation in la-
bor laws in India. While most of the regulations were passed at the central level,
the state governments have the right to amend and enforce the regulations under the
Indian Constitution. Therefore, the cross-state variation in the data on the labor
market legislation comes from the amendments made to the labor acts and regula-
tions. The main objective of my empirical investigation is to provide evidence that
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plants operating in states with protected labor markets are more likely to have lower
productivity levels than plants operating in states with exible labor markets.
A number of empirical works have found that regulatory environments in in-
put and output markets can encourage competition and have a positive impact on
measures of productivity. In the context of labor markets, even in relatively less pro-
ductive economies, labor market reforms could also encourage competition among
establishments. For example, stringent regulations may reduce productivity by mak-
ing it more dicult for resources to ow from low productivity establishments to high
productivity ones. To examine the impact of state-level labor reform on productivity,
I consider a panel regression of the form:
Log(Projst) = 0+1Dinxs+2Downerj+3KLj+4Dnicit+5 inxiDnic+t+jst
(4.7)
where Projsit denotes productivity of plant j operating in state s and industry i
and at year t. TFP and labor productivity are used as the measures of productivity
for the dependent variable. Dinxs is a dummy variable showing state-level labor
market reform index. States with labor market reform index above the median are
considered as having exible labor market and states with score below the median are
considered as having inexible labor market. Then, the dummy variable is dened
as Dinxs = 1 ; if the state has a exible labor market and Dinxs = 0 ; if the
state has a inexible labor market.
I also control for plant ownership (Downerj), plant capital-labor ratio (KLj),
and industry-level labor intensity (Dnicit). Downerj represents ownership type of
106
plant j. I assign Downers = 1 ; if a plant is privately owned, and Downers = 0
otherwise. Dnicit is the measure of labor-intensity in industry i at year t. It is
measured as the total number of workers in the industry to the industry-level value
of xed assets. The last terms in the equation captures the interaction of state-level
labor market reform score (inxs) and industry-level labor intensity (Dnicit). I added
this variable to see if plants in more labor-intensive industries benet more from labor
market reforms. The industry-level labor intensity is calculated from industry-wise
ASI sample with total plants as the ratio of xed assets to total number of workers.
In the Indian industry, the manufacturing of \Tobacco and Related Products" (NIC.
16) and manufacturing of \Wearing Apparel, Dressing and Dyeing of Fur" (NIC. 18)
have the highest labor intensity, while, manufacturing of \Coke, Petroleum Products
and Nuclear Fuel" (NIC. 23) and manufacturing of \Basic Metals" (NIC. 15) have the
lowest average labor intensity. To control for year xed eects, I add a plant-specic
trend to each regression model.
4.5 Results
The regression model 4.7 is estimated using the balanced panel rst. Then, since
the labor market laws are more likely to aect larger establishments, I estimate the
model with the balanced panel but with plant-size restrictions. In particular, I use
a balanced panel of establishments with less than 100 workers and then a sample of
plants with more than 100 workers to examine if small and large plants are aected
dierently by the regulations. Table 4.5 provides results of the rst two regressions
with the unrestricted balanced panel.
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Table 4{5: Impact of Labor Market Reforms
Variable Log (TFP) Log (Y/L)
State-level labor reform score (dummy variable) 0.148 0.657
(0.392) (0.457)
Plant ownership (dummy variable) 0.103 0.013
(0.074) (0.086)
Plant capital-labor ratio -0.002 0.013**
(0.000) (0.000)
Industry labor intensity 0.038 0.054
(0.101) (0.117)
Interaction of labor reform score and industry labor intensity 0.005 -0.022
(0.004) (0.005)
Constant 3.421** 1.348**
(0.284) (0.331)
Number of obs 17410 17410
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.2769 0.4217
Adj R-squared 0.1959 0.357
Plant trend Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0:01, *p < 0:05
In the rst two regressions with unrestricted plants, I estimated the impact of
labor market reforms on plant labor productivity and TFP. The state-level employ-
ment protection legislation and its interaction with the industry-level labor intensity
show no signicant impact on total factor productivity or labor productivity. I re-
strict the sample and include plants with minimum 100 employees to capture the
impact of labor market reforms on larger establishments. Table 4.6 provides the
results.
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Table 4{6: Impact of Labor Market Reforms (panel of large plants)
Variable Log (TFP) Log (Y/L)
State-level labor reform score (dummy variable) 1.227* 1.493*
(0.630) (0.732)
Plant ownership (dummy variable) 0.113 0.025
(0.071) (0.082)
Plant capital-labor ratio 0.002 0.019**
(0.000) (0.000)
Industry labor intensity -0.108** -0.297*
(0.107) (0.125)
Interaction of labor reform score and industry labor intensity 0.011** -0.012
(0.005) (0.005)
Constant 3.393** 1.300**
(12.680) (4.180)
Number of obs 15035 15035
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.3173 0.4909
Adj R-squared 0.2273 0.4238
Plant trend Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0:01, *p < 0:05
By controlling for the size of establishments, the regression models provide dif-
ferent outcomes. The state-level labor reform has a moderate positive impact on
productivity in both TFP and labor productivity. The interaction of state-level
labor reform score and industry-level labor intensity also shows a positive impact
on TFP. This result implies that the impact of reforms on productivity is larger
in industries where plants rely more on labor than in industries in which labor is
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relatively less important than capital in the production process. In addition, in in-
dustries with more frequent labor adjustment, regulations are more likely to hurt
productivity because rms will have a harder time adjusting the labor input usage.
My point estimates show that reforms in the states with inexible labor market that
increase their labor reform score to the median, will increase log(TFP) by 1.23 and
log(Y/L) by 1.49. The results also imply that one unit increase in the interaction
of state-level labor reform score and industry labor-intensity causes to 0.011 unit
increase in log(TFP) of plants with at least 100 employees.
Finally, I estimate the model to examine the potential impact of labor market
regulations on productivity of establishments with less than 100 employees (Table
4.7).
As the table shows, there is no signicant association between state-level labor
reforms and measures of productivity in plants with less than 100 employees. The
interaction of state-level labor reform score and industry-level labor intensity also
does not show any signicant relationship with the plant-level TFP or labor produc-
tivity. This result is consistent with the study of Dougherty (2008) who shows that
for small rms in India with 100 or fewer workers, job creation rates were more than
double job destruction rates for this group of rms, causing employment in small
rms to increase by more than 20% a year during 1998-2004. He also found that
despite the absence of restrictive dismissal laws for smaller rms, the job destruction
rate in small plants was actually less than that in larger ones. In contrast, for rms
having a minimum 100 employees, the impact of labor reforms is higher than its
impact on smaller rms and job creation rate for those rms was low and well below
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Table 4{7: Impact of Labor Market Reforms (panel of small plants)
Variable Log (TFP) Log (Y/L)
State-level labor reform score (dummy variable) 1.729 1.840
(1.676) (1.869)
Plant ownership (dummy variable) 0.303 0.243
(0.714) (0.796)
Plant capital-labor ratio -0.001 0.005**
(0.001) (0.001)
Industry labor intensity 1.212* 1.962**
(0.501) (0.559)
Interaction of labor reform score and industry labor intensity -0.046 -0.092
(0.022) (0.025)
Constant 1.799 0.525
(1.308) (1.459)
Number of obs 2375 2375
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.6287 0.6591
Adj R-squared 0.3167 0.3726
Plant trend Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0:01, *p < 0:05
the job destruction rate. For larger rms the net employment of fell by more than
5% per year in the period 1998 to 2004 while job creation for contract workers in
large rms was twice the rate for large rms' regular workers.
4.6 Conclusions
Employment protection legislation raises the cost of employment for rms and
has a detrimental impact on labor adjustment process that is vital to economic
growth and technological progress. Labor market regulations also limit job turnover
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in industries that need frequent adjustment of workers for technological reasons or
competition.
In this chapter, I examined the impact of state-level labor reforms on plant-
level measures of productivity in India. I assessed how labor reform strategies across
the Indian states could aect plant-level TFP and labor productivity. The main
nding of this study implies that plants with at least 100 employees, operating in
labor-intensive industries are more likely to benet from labor market reforms in
terms of an improvement in TFP and labor productivity. I also showed that an
improvement in the degree of labor market reform will have a positive impact on
TFP and labor productivity and these eects remain even after controlling for some
state-level variables. The state-level labor reforms could increase job turnover or
exibility in the labor markets while a lack of such reforms limits labor turnover
and negatively impacts the labor adjustment process particularly in labor-intensive
industries. This study found that the state-level labor reform does not seem to have
any important eect on small plants.
Despite the fact that this study exploits the variation in state-level labor reform
scores, the lack of time series information on labor market reforms may inuence
the results. Time series data on labor reforms across the states could allow future
studies to measure changes in productivity over time. In addition, my study used a
balanced panel of plants without accounting for entry and exit eects, which might
also have a signicant impact on industry performance.
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APPENDIX A
Indirect Utility Function
To nd the indirect utility function, note that by denition,
x = 1
N
R
xcidi and var(x) =
1
N
R
(xi   x)2 di
substitution into consumer preferences yields,
U = xc0 + N x  N2var(p)  N2 x2( + N)
where var(p) = 2var(x) From demand function pi =    xci   X, we can show
that x =  p
+N
then, the consumer's preferences becomes,
U = xc0 + N x  N2var(p)  N2 x(   p)
The consumer's budget constraint is denoted by Ic and is dened by,
Ic = xc0 +
R
pi x
c
i di
From pi =    xci   X, and X = N x, we can show that,R
pi xi di = N xp  N var(p)
Then, total consumer's budget constraint becomes,
Ic = xc0 +N xp  N var(p)
Substituting Ic in U , yields the indirect utility function as,
U = Ic + N
2
var(p) + 1
2
N x(   p)
In order to evaluate the indirect utility function, by denition we have ' = k+1
k
',
and we can calculate,
var( 1
'
) = k
(k+1)2(k+2)
(') 2
Then, from (19),
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This equation along with (18), (28), and (29) gives equation (32) in the text.
U = Ic + N
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
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APPENDIX B
National Industrial Classication(NIC)
The rst National Industrial Classication in India adopted in 1959. With
eect from ASI 1973-74, the National Industrial Classication (NIC) 1970 developed
based on UNISIC 1968. NIC has been revised several times due to the industrial
development in India and other administration issues. The following table outlines
National Industrial Classication (NIC) and its coverage since ASI 1973. The 5-digit
Table B{1: India National Industrial Classication (NIC)
National Industrial Classication Coverage
NIC 1970 ASI 1973-1974 to ASI 1988-1989
NIC 1987 ASI 1989-1990 to ASI 1997-1998
NIC 1998 ASI 1998-1999 to ASI 2003-2004
NIC 2004 ASI 2004-2005 to ASI 2009-2010
National Industry Classication (NIC) codes of Iron and Steel Industry is outlined
in the following table.
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Table B{2: Basic Metals, National Industry Classication (NIC), 5-Digit Codes
Description
27110 ferro alloys.
27120 Direct Reduced Iron (DRI)/ Sponge Iron
27130 Pig Iron
27141 semi -nished non ally steel of these shapes
27142 semi -nished alloy steel of these shapes
27143 semi -nished stainless steel of these shapes
27151 alloy-steel of these shapes
27152 non-alloy steel of these shapes
27153 stainless steel of these shapes
27161 non-alloy steel hot rolled at products
27162 alloy steel hot rolled at products
27163 stainless steel hot rolled at products
27164 non-alloy steel cold rolled at products
27165 alloy steel cold rolled at products
27171 GP/GC/Zn-Al. coated sheets/ Color coated
27172 Tinplate
27173 Tin Free Steel
27181 non-alloy steel wires
27182 alloy steel wires
27183 stainless steel wires
27184 wires coated with zinc or other materials
27190 other basic iron and steel n.e.c.
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APPENDIX C
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI)
The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) is the principal source of industrial statis-
tics in India. It provides statistical information to assess and evaluate, objectively
and realistically, the changes in the growth, composition and structure of organized
manufacturing sector comprising activities related to manufacturing processes, repair
services, gas and water supply and cold storage. The Survey is conducted annually
under the statutory provisions of the Collection of Statistics Act 1953. The de-
nition of census and sample have been changed several times after the rst ASI in
1986. The rst coverage of the survey under census sector was all units with 50 or
more workers operating with power, and units having 100 or more workers operat-
ing without power. The procedure continued until ASI 1986-87 by which time the
total number of factories in India grew enormously. Accordingly, the denition of
the census sector was changed from ASI 1987-88 to the units having 100 or more
workers irrespective of their operation with or without power. This design continued
until ASI 1996-97. In 1998, to maintain the budget limit a new sampling design was
adopted in ASI 1997-98. The census sector was redened to include units having 200
or more workers and signicant industrial units having less than 200 workers. This
approach signicantly reduced the sample size in ASI 1997-98 compared to that of
ASI 1996-97 while maintaining a fair level of degree of precision for the estimates up
to the state level. In 2005, following the decision taken in the Standing Committee
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on Industrial Statistics (SCIS), the sampling design for ASI 2004-05 to ASI 2008-09
changed again and covered units with 100 or more workers as census sector and the
rest of the units as sample sector, without any change in the existing criteria.
Table C{1: Sampling Design of Census Sample Criteria
Coverage Criteria
100 or more workers
ASI 1980-81 to ASI 1986-87 50 or more workers with power
All plants in 12 industrially backward states
ASI 1987-88 to ASI 1996-97 100 or more workers (with or without power)
All plants in (same) 12 industrially backward states
200 or more workers
ASI 1997-98 to ASI 2003-04 Selected \Signicant Units" with fewer than 200 workers which
\contributed signicantly to the Value of Output" in ASI data
between 1993-94 and 1995-96
All plants in (same) 12 industrially backward states
All public sector undertakings
ASI 2004-05 to ASI 2008-09 100 or more workers
All plants in 5 industrially backward states
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APPENDIX D
Iron and Steel Making Technologies
The Indian Iron and Steel industry has experiences a remarkable growth since
1990s. India was the fteenth largest steel producer in the world in 1998. In 2013, In-
dia has become the 4th largest crude steel producer and the world's largest producer
of direct reduced iron. The following graph shows share of India in the world produc-
tion of crude steel. The Iron and Steel industry heavily depends on the production
Figure D{1: Share of India in the World Production of Crude Steel (%)
technology and process. Around 70% of total steel production in the world is through
Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF), 28.8% by Electric Steel Making (EAF&EIF) and the
balance 1.2% through the Open Hearth Furnace (OHF). The open hearth route is
an inecient technology and almost extincts in most of steel producing countries.
In terms of production units, there are two types of steel producers: (1) primary or
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integrated producers and (2) secondary producers. In the integrated units, Pig Iron
and Sponge Iron are produced from iron ore rst and then they are converted to
crude steel. Crude steel is used further for rolling, casting, blooming, slabbing, or
coating products. Integrated producers in India use Blast Furnace (BF) and Direct
Reduced (DR) technologies to produce iron and Open Hearth Furnace (OHF) and
Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF) to produce steel. In the terms of energy inputs, coal
and gas are the main inputs in the primary Iron and Steel making process. In partic-
ular, coal is the main energy for blast furnace and open hearth furnace while liquid
hydrocarbons are used in direct reduced and Basic Oxygen Furnaces. Secondary
units produce steel from sponge iron or steel scrape using electric arc furnace (EAF)
or electric induction furnace (EIF). Electricity is the main energy in these produc-
tion root. Basic Oxygen Furnace is the main large scale technology to produce steel.
Figure D{2: Share of Basic Oxygen Furnace in Steel Production in India (%)
The average share of Basic Oxygen Furnace in production of crude steel in India
has decreased from 50.8% in 1990-04 to 41.4% in 2005-08. Open-Hearth Furnace
is characterized by low eciency and quality of output. In many steel producing
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Figure D{3: Share of Open-Hearth Furnace in Steel Production in India (%)
units in India, Open-Hearth Furnaces are shutdown or replaced by newer technolo-
gies. The average share of crude steel production by OHF in India has decreased
from 16.6% in 1990-04 to 2% in 2005-08. Electric Arc Furnaces range in size from
Figure D{4: Share of Electric Furnace in Steel Production in India (%)
small to large units and are used for secondary steel-making. The average share of
this technology has increased from 32.6% in 1990-04 to 56.6% in 2005-08. Steel is
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produced through a complicated processes involving many stages and yielding thou-
sands of by-products. Steel is produced from either steel scrap or iron ore. On the
basis of production technology, Iron and steel producers are classied to two types
of producers: integrated producers and secondary producers. Integrated producers
are large units with advanced technologies that operate ore and coke mines. They
produces iron ore in the iron-making process and then use iron ore to produce steel.
Integrated steel units traditionally have captive plants for iron ore and coke, which
are the main inputs to these units.1 In contrast, the secondary producers are mini-
steel plants. They make steel by melting scrap or sponge iron or a mixture of the
two. The secondary steel producers use less complicated technologies and electricity
is the main input. For the both producers, material and the process substantially
aect quality of steel and the total energy consumed during production. In the iron-
making step, ore is reduced to either pig iron or sponge iron. Pig iron production
occurs in blast furnaces where coke is the primary fuel. Sponge iron is produced by
direct reduction (DR) processes using fossil fuels and coal. The conversion of ore
into pig iron is the most energy-intensive stage of steel making. In a conventional
integrated steel plant, pig iron is produced in a blast furnace, using coke in combi-
nation with injected coal, oil, or gas. Blast furnaces are operated at various scales,
ranging from mini-blast furnaces to large furnaces. Sponge iron, produced by direct
1 Currently there are three main integrated producers in India namely Steel Au-
thority of India Limited (SAIL), Tata Iron and Steel Co Ltd (TISCO)and Rashtriya
Ispat Nigam Ltd (RINL)
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reduction (DR) processes, has dierent properties from pig iron. In the DR process,
iron is produced by reducing the ores using syngas from dierent fossil fuels (mainly
oil or natural gas; in India coal or gas based) in small-scale plants. DR iron (or
sponge iron) serves as high quality alternative for scrap in secondary steel-making.
Steel-making is the reduction of the amount of carbon in the hot iron metal to a
level below 1.9 percent through the oxidation of carbon and silicon.
Primary Steel Producers
Most primary steel is produced by two processes: open hearth furnace (OHF)
and basic oxygen furnace (BOF). While OHF is an older technology and uses more
energy, this process can also use more scrap than the BOF process. However, BOF
process is rapidly replacing OHF worldwide because of its greater productivity and
lower capital costs. In addition, this process needs no net input of energy and can
even be a net energy exporter in the form of BOF-gas and steam. The process
operates through the injection of oxygen, oxidizing the carbon in the hot metal.
Several congurations exist depending on the way the oxygen is injected. The steel
quality can be improved further by ladle rening processes used in the steel mill.
Secondary Steel Producers
Secondary steel is produced in an electric arc furnace (EAF) using scrap. In
secondary steel production, the scrap is melted and rened, using a strong electric
current. Steel making based on external scrap (scrap from outside the steel sector)
requires less than half as much primary energy as steel made from ore. In a continuous
steel casting process, liquid steel is directly cast into semi-nished products. The
semi-nished steel is fed in to re-rolling mills to get nished steel products. Finished
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Figure D{5: Iron Making Technologies
steel products are classied in to two types of nished carbon steel or nished alloy
steel. Long products are bars, rods, channels, angles and other structural materials
are nished carbon steel. Finished steel products are used in the construction and
engineering industry and, to some extent, in the manufacturing sector. Flat products
also another type of carbon steel consist of sheets, coils and plates. Alloy steels can
be further classied into two categories of stainless steel and alloy steels.
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Figure D{6: Steel Making Technologies
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APPENDIX E
OECD Indicators of Employment Protection
Methodology
The OECD employment protection indicators are compiled from 21 items cov-
ering dierent aspects of employment protection regulations as they were in force on
January 1st of each year:
 Individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts, incorporating three as-
pects of dismissal protection: (i) procedural inconveniences that employers
face when starting the dismissal process, such as notication and consultation
requirements; (ii) notice periods and severance pay, which typically vary by
tenure of the employee; and (iii) diculty of dismissal, as determined by the
circumstances in which it is possible to dismiss workers, as well as the repercus-
sions for the employer if a dismissal is found to be unfair (such as compensation
and reinstatement).
 Additional costs for collective dismissals. Most countries impose additional
delays, costs or notication procedures when an employer dismisses a large
number of workers at one time. The indicator measuring these costs includes
only additional costs which go beyond those applicable for individual dismissal.
It does not reect the overall strictness of regulation of collective dismissals,
which is the sum of costs for individual dismissals and any additional cost of
collective dismissals.
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 Regulation of temporary contracts, including regulation of xed-term and tem-
porary work agency contracts with respect to the types of work for which these
contracts are allowed and their duration, as well as regulation governing the
establishment and operation of temporary work agencies and requirements for
agency workers to receive the same pay and/or conditions as equivalent workers
in the user rm, which can increase the cost of using temporary agency workers
relative to hiring workers on permanent contracts.
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APPENDIX F
State Labor Reform Questionnaire Summary Responses
Figure F{1: Source: Dougherty, 2009
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